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CHAPTER 1: Problem Statement
Problem Statement
Evaluators can use cost-effectiveness analysis to help policy makers choose a course 
for improving student achievement. However, existing cost estimates of one such course, 
school choice programs, ignore significant non-linear allocation effects created by these 
policies. These effects are too complex for description by systems of equations; I propose 
that computer simulation will provide a more accurate and portable method of estimating 
these costs.
Significance
Dissatisfaction with American public schools arises often in both popular and 
academic writing. For example, some researchers argue that student achievement is too low 
based on comparisons with other countries, predicting that the global status enjoyed by the 
United States will not endure if our students do not keep pace with students in other 
countries on international tests (Hanushek & Lindseth, 2009). Others argue that the 
persistent racial achievement gap shows that American schools under-serve their students 
(Ladson-Billings, 2006).
A serious problem like low student achievement has elicited a great variety of 
responses from education reformers (see below). Each of these proposals, however, 
presents some sort of cost, and resource constraints require choosing among them instead of 
simply implementing a large number of ideas that demonstrate benefit to students. Public 
education has not recently enjoyed extravagant funding, and the national recession and 
increased focus on accountability testing have further squeezed education budgets to the 
point where class sizes are rising and programs are being cut (Caesar & Watanabe, 2011;-2 
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Beveridge, 2010). Budgets are especially tight for those students our education system 
should work hardest to help: funding levels and standardized test scores are positively 
correlated (Ladson-Billings, 2006), so the student populations whose achievement most 
needs raising also attend schools with relatively lower funding. According to Duncombe 
(2006), factors like high voter education level, a large proportion of voters over 65 years 
of age, and low average voter wealth increase pressure on districts, through election of 
school boards, to keep education spending as low as possible while still achieving 
satisfactory results. This pressure will prevent districts from spending sufficient 
resources to enact all beneficial educational interventions; districts must select policies 
that lead to desired educational outcomes at the lowest cost.
Policy makers responsible for implementing one of the many proposed methods 
of raising student achievement face a difficult choice. Yeh (2010) identified 22 proposed 
remedies for low student achievement, and these proposals differ remarkably from each 
other in terms of their targets and theories of operation. School choice programs—thei 
set of programs discussed primarily in this paper, including school vouchers, charter 
schools, and open enrollment—attempt to effect change in school districts that will 
improve schools through competition (Hoxby, 2003) and ultimately benefit all students. 
Some proposals, like comprehensive school reform, focus on changing schools directly 
(Rowan, Camburn, & Barnes, 2004). Others assert that student performance will rise as 
a result of changing requirements for teachers through, for example, requiring more 
intensive certification (Darlington-Hammond, Berry, Thoreson, 2001). Yet other 
proposals, like frequent formative assessment, act on students directly (Yeh, 2007). 
Because proposals for raising student achievement are so substantially diverse, 
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meaningful and systematic comparison poses a challenge.
Despite the significant heterogeneity of these proposed solutions, limited 
resources makes choosing among them necessary. For policy makers faced with the task 
of improving education while keeping costs down, obtaining the biggest “bang for the 
buck” is essential. Some researchers and evaluators have adopted a formal approach, 
cost-effectiveness analysis, to find the most economically efficient policy for improving 
education with the hope of assisting policy makers with the tough choices they face. 
Economists have long employed this form of analysis to compare programs with 
different outcomes in search of the most efficient application of resources (Robinson, 
1993). This method of analysis has effectively, although not broadly, been employed in 
education research (Levin & McEwan, 2001). Cost-effectiveness analysis measures all 
of the programs in terms of a standard metric of effectiveness—often student 
achievement on standardized test scores in math and reading for these kinds of programs
—and the total economic cost of each program. Evaluators can then usefully compare 
these various programs by examining the cost per unit of effectiveness.
Meaningful cost-effectiveness analysis requires both accurate costs and 
quantities representing effectiveness for all options under comparison. A significant 
amount of research over many years has gone into assembling measures of effectiveness 
and estimates of costs that comparing the many existing proposals will require. 
Measures of the effectiveness of school choice programs exist in some depth and 
quantity in the literature, and will not receive extensive comment in this paper. Several 
school systems including Dayton, Ohio, New York City, and Washington DC (Howell, 
Wolf, Campbell, & Peterson, 2002) have attempted long-term, large scale voucher 
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programs or charter school programs, and sufficient research has been undertaken on 
these projects to conclude that both voucher programs and charter schools have a 
positive overall effect on student achievement for those students using vouchers to 
choose a different school or attending a charter school (Howell, Wolf, Campbell, & 
Peterson, 2002; Barrow & Rouse, 2008).
The cost of school choice programs used in cost-effectiveness analysis, on the 
other hand, remains controversial and the subject of much debate, with statements of 
cost neutrality—nearly $0 per student—on the low end (Coulson, 1998) and costs as 
high as $9,646 per student on the high end (Yeh, 2010). If we base a cost-effectiveness 
analysis on a faulty, artificially low cost, the effectiveness-cost ratio will be unduly high, 
falsely indicating the desirability of the program and posing the risk of adopting a 
surprisingly expensive, inefficient policy. If we use an artificially high cost estimate, the 
program will appear less efficient than it is, and policy makers might pass up a 
potentially valuable opportunity to increase student achievement at a desirable price. 
Because determining efficient education policy to remedy the important problem of low 
student achievement requires meaningful cost-effectiveness analysis, and meaningful 
cost-effectiveness analysis requires accurate cost estimates, improving cost estimates of 
school choice programs is a vital step in addressing low student achievement.
Researchers have focused on many facets of the economic impact of school 
choice programs, and have used many tools to estimate those costs. A few examples of 
different foci while estimating costs of school choice programs include transportation 
costs and their associated environmental impact (Wilson, Wilson, & Krizek, 2007), the 
cost of providing information to parents and adjudicating disputes (Levin & Driver, 
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1997), and economic impacts on family mobility (Nechyba, 2000). The facet that I 
intend to focus on involves “allocation effects”: the impact on efficiency of moving 
students between schools due to school choice programs. The central issue of allocation 
effects concerns the different unit size between the primary revenue source for schools 
(i.e., students) and the primary cost (i.e., teachers). Yeh (2007) argued that if a school 
choice program draws a small number of students from a district, then a small number of 
students will be drawn from each grade in each school (between 0.05 and 3.27 students 
per grade level per school in the analyzed programs) and this small decrease in 
enrollment will not allow for a decrease in overhead costs or faculty costs. Most cost 
estimates of allocation effects of school choice programs (I will henceforth refer to this 
category of costs as allocation costs) take an aggregate perspective (Yeh, 2007; Yeh 
2010; Heinesen, 2004), but the complexity of the school district as a system indicates 
that analytic descriptions of aggregate behavior may be intractable. Two characteristics 
indicate the appropriateness of a component- or agent-based approach (these approaches 
differ slightly in that agents can make decisions about their behavior, and components 
cannot). First, the relationship between the number of students removed from a school to 
participate in a school choice program and the reduction in cost to educate the remaining 
students is not linear, so analytically extending componential rules to aggregate behavior 
is likely not possible. Second, the components of the system—in this case the students 
and teachers—depend on each other to some degree, which further excludes an analytic 
solution. These non-linear behaviors and interdependent components are difficult to 
account for in aggregate analysis, but relatively easy to include in an agent-based model. 
The lack of agent-based cost estimation techniques for allocation costs in the literature 
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indicates that our understanding of the system is less than what it could be, and that 
evaluators and policy makers are developing policies and programs based on 
unnecessarily imprecise information.
Purpose of the Study and Research Questions
This study has two purposes. Primarily, I hope to help numerical simulation gain 
a foothold in the field of cost estimations of education programs. To do this, I will 
explore a specific example of how cost estimations can be improved with numerical 
simulation. The specific goal of this research is to give evaluators and policy makers a 
tool for ex ante estimation of the allocation costs of a proposed school choice program 
for use in a practical, non-academic setting like a school district considering a policy 
change. School choice programs vary widely along many dimensions (Yeh, 2007), as do 
school districts, so policy makers cannot heavily rely on estimated costs in the literature 
when weighing costs and effects of particular options for policy implementation in a 
school district. Some existing data-based cost estimation techniques applied to school 
choice programs use rough assumptions and simple accounting (see Levin and Driver, 
1997). This sort of estimation is useful as a way of abstractly describing the type of 
costs that might be generated by a school choice program, but these methods cannot 
account for subtle complexity, such as allocation effects, that would inform a particular 
policy discussion. Elasticity analysis, which relies on regression, offers another 
approach to estimating the economic impact of school choice programs, but this method 
often requires many years of quite specific data about enrollment and school 
organization—see Heinesen (2003) for an example of the quantity and specificity of 
data required to conduct a useful elasticity analysis on school choice programs (that 
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study uses 12 years of data and very advanced statistical methods). This volume of data 
may not be available in all cases, and, if the policy shift under consideration is 
motivated by dramatic change in the school district, comparisons between the early data 
and the recent data may not be appropriate. In light of these needs, one aim of this study 
is to create a portable technique for estimating allocation costs for use in ground-level 
decision making. By ‘portable’ I mean that the technology, data, and expertise required 
to use it might reasonably be available to evaluators and policy makers considering a 
proposed school choice program.
Secondarily, this study intends to bring cost estimation in education one step 
closer to the state of the art proven in other economic fields by developing an agent-
based method for estimating allocation costs. The perspectives and technology widely 
used in estimating allocation costs rely on aggregate behavior extrapolated by theorists 
from componential rules. This philosophy lags behind that adopted elsewhere in the 
economics of education and in other economic fields (for example, see Senge and 
Sterman, 1992). I will discuss the importance of this goal more in the Conceptual 
Framework section below. 
In pursuit of these two goals, I will focus on the following questions:
(1) Can the resources (computing power, level of detail of data and information, 
etc.) available to practicing evaluators generate useful predictions of the costs of 
school choice programs?
(2) How sensitive are faculty costs to enrollment changes caused by school 
choice programs?
(3) How much will a proposed school choice program cost due to inefficiencies 
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created by allocation effects?
To answer these questions, I will select a school district to model with an agent-
based computer simulation. Beginning with actual enrollment data and class size policy, 
I will construct a series of increasingly complex models ranging from models with no 
interaction between components (i.e., students) to more complex models that include 
both positive and negative feedback effects. 
For each model, I will employ an approach pioneered in financial stress-testing 
(Sorge, 2004): I will subject the model of the district to counterfactual stress—in this 
case, the removal of a number of students for participation in a hypothetical school 
choice program—and use class size policy from that district to determine how many 
teaching positions could be eliminated. Many iterations of this process will allow me to 
create a probability distribution of faculty reductions for each scenario.
Changes in faculty size represents an intermediate step to discussing the cost of a school 
choice program. I will use the model of faculty size response to small enrollment 
changes described above and accounting data from the district (e.g., per pupil spending, 
average faculty salary, etc.) to estimate the financial impact on the students remaining in 
the district. 
Two distinct methods to create and calibrate these models are available. Gilbert 
and Terna (2000) describe a hierarchy of methods for calibrating numerical simulation 
and assessing their accuracy. These methods aims to match the behavior of the model 
and its components as exactly as possible to the observed behavior of real entities, and 
to verify this similarity through the “quantitative agreement with empirical 
microstructures, as determined from cross-sectional and longitudinal analysis of the 
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agent population” (p. 66). One method that I will pursue will follow this assessment and 
rely as much as possible on calibration to original research on actual parent and 
administrator decision making behavior in the district under study. This sort of specific 
information might offer a very accurate description of a particular district, but such 
specificity will make the results esoteric and less useful to evaluators in other districts. A 
more portable method for constructing this model will rely heavily on calibration to 
easily obtainable data, findings in the literature, and then choosing at random from a 
wide range of possible modes of operation, similar to the approach used by Nechyba 
(2000) in Tiebout modeling of the relationship between school choice programs and 
housing values; this method will allow evaluators to easily apply a computer simulation 
to new school districts. I can then conduct sensitivity analyses to determine how much 
specific information is necessary for evaluators and policy makers to arrive at a useful 
estimate of allocation costs.
I initially grounded this research as pertaining to the achievement gap, but that 
statement should be moderated for two reasons. General Creighton Abrams quipped that 
we should eat elephants one bite at a time. First, this work will not eliminate the 
achievement gap on its own, but I do hope that the ideas presented here will contribute 
to the improvement of education in the US. Second, although improving the cost 
estimates of school choice programs will (at least theoretically) contribute to the quality 
of the education system, using numerical simulation to tackle nonlinear systems has 
applications beyond the specific context described above. I hope that the general 
applicability of these methods will not get lost in the discussion of this specific project.
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Key Terms and Concepts
Definition of some the frequently-used terms in this paper will enhance its 
clarity.
Componential and aggregate. Componential behavior refers to the rules that govern the 
behavior of a single unit. Taking an example from chemistry, a molecule of water has 
certain properties (mass, polarity, bond strength, etc.) that describe its action and 
interaction with other molecules. Because of these properties, a water molecule will 
react predictably in known environments. Aggregate behavior refers to the rules that 
govern a group of interacting units. To continue with the example from chemistry, a cup 
of water has its own set of properties (density, boiling point, etc.). In the case of water, 
some of the aggregate characteristics, like boiling point, can be thoroughly described in 
terms of some of the componential characteristics, like intermolecular forces. The 
difference, though, is that some of the aggregate properties do not have componential 
analogues: a single molecule of water does not have a boiling point; only a collection of 
interacting water molecules does.
Analytical and Numerical. Some aggregate behavior can be described analytically, i.e., 
an exact solution can be obtained using a manageable set of equations, and some cannot. 
Leombruni and Richiardi (2005) observed that “many systems are characterized by the 
fact that their aggregate properties [i.e., aggregate behavior] cannot be deduced simply 
by looking at how each component behaves [i.e., componential behavior]” (p. 1). The 
algebra required to solve the componential equations in these systems is either so vast 
that it is practically unsolvable with finite resources, or logically unsolvable. On the 
other hand, numerical methods do not make an attempt to deduce aggregate behavior 
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from componential rules; numerical methods iteratively apply componential rules across 
time or agents within a system. Where the theorist converts the componential to the 
aggregate through brain power in analytical pursuits, in numerical methods a computer 
often performs the calculations that allow the system to evolve; the theorist then exams 
the resulting system and comments on evident aggregate behavior.
Conceptual Framework
This study is based on the premise that numerical simulation offers researchers 
and practitioners a powerful tool for solving mathematical problems, but also a new way 
to view questions and systems. In other words, numerical simulation offers a way to 
solve math problems in complex systems, but it also leads to a new vocabulary and a 
new set of concepts with which to define the world (Ostrom, 1988). In numerical 
simulation, exploring a system begins not with a search for analytic equations that 
describe aggregate behavior, but with simple componential rules that interact to describe 
the aggregate behavior.
The notion that social systems are too chaotic or complex (i.e., impossible to 
predict future states, sensitive to initial conditions, etc.) to describe with analytical 
models was borrowed from physics and mathematics beginning in the late 1980s 
(Gregersen & Sailer, 1993), so an example from physics may help clarify this 
perspective. The solutions to the two body problem (e.g., a comet orbiting the Sun) and 
the three body problem (e.g., two moons orbiting the same planet and gravitationally 
interacting with each other) in physics depict cases that show when analytic solutions 
work and when they do not. Before computers, physicists had to use increasingly 
sophisticated mathematics to describe observable behavior that follows simple rules. 
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Isaac Newton invented whole disciplines of mathematics in order to analytically 
describe the observable universe (Westfall, 1994). After Newton hypothesized that the 
only force at work in the heavens was gravity acting with an inverse square law, he used 
(and largely developed) calculus, then a nascent tool, to show that the orbits of comets 
and planets around the Sun described by Kepler could be explained solely by gravity. In 
this approach, the aggregate behavior of the comet can be explained to the extent that 
the theorist can conceptualize how the componential behavior of gravity and momentum 
leads to aggregate behavior of comet trajectory. For hundreds of years, the relationship 
between componential and aggregate proceeded in this fashion: the only way to use 
mathematics to understand the universe was to develop increasingly sophisticated 
equations that convert the componential to the aggregate through analytic solutions. But 
some questions lie beyond the capacity of sophisticated mathematics to find analytics 
solutions: Newton solved the two body problem analytically but never solved the three 
body problem, and neither has anyone else.
Newton could not solve the three body problem, but even inexpensive computers 
today can do so with ease (Appel, 1985). Computers accomplish this not by finding 
analytic solutions that humans cannot, but by applying the simple rules that govern 
componential behavior (the inverse square law of gravity and the definition of 
momentum in the case of the three body problem) many times for very short time 
intervals. The solutions are numerical, not analytic, in that they do not result in an 
equation that can be solved with arithmetic and algebra for where bodies will be, but it 
is possible to calculate the location of the three bodies at any time, and the accuracy of 
the position is limited only by the computational resources. Numerical solutions do not 
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require that the theorist can mathematically conceptualize the relationship between the 
componential behavior and aggregate behavior; a computer applies the rules that govern 
the componential behavior, and the theorist observes and contextualizes the aggregate 
behavior that results (Leombruni & Richiardi, 2005).
Numerical solutions to the three body problem both allow scientists to determine 
if and when a particular asteroid will hit Earth, but also open the door to a new realm of 
questions to ask, questions that would have been beyond the horizon if only analytic 
solutions were available. Scientists can extend the three body problem to a system in 
which two galaxies, each made of millions of bodies, collide—all the math is the same 
(the inverse square law for gravity and the definition of momentum) but the number of 
bodies and the required computing power are greater by orders of magnitude. An 
analytical approach to describe colliding galaxies, called the Boltzmann equation, 
theoretically exists, “[u]nfortunately, we don’t know how to obtain relevant analytics 
solutions to this equation except in the limit of weak interactions … or for rather 
limiting special systems …, so numerical methods must be used” (Barnes & Hernquist, 
1992, p. 707-8). Numerical simulation, while certainly a tool to solve known problems, 
also focuses on observing aggregate behavior based on repeated application of 
componential rules, with little concern at the front end for how the former is caused by 
the latter. In this sense numerical simulation and searching for analytic solutions 
represent substantially different frameworks for describing aggregate behavior.
Physicists Stan Ulam and John Von Neumann developed the first numerical 
simulation in 1946 to solve problems involving the penetration of neutron radiation into 
various materials during radioactive decay (Eckhardt, 1987). Prior to numerical 
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simulation, physicists could describe how one neutron would behave, but encountered 
insurmountable difficulty in developing equations to describe how many neutrons would 
behave. An analytic solution eluded them, so they invented a technique to use computers 
and random numbers to perform componential calculations repeatedly with the hope of 
understanding the aggregate behavior well enough to proceed with their research. Since 
that development, diverse fields such as statistics (Briggs, Wonderling, & Mooney, 
1997), meteorology (Silver, 2012), epidemiology (Hethcote, 2000), asset risk analysis 
(Hertz, 1957), earthquake prediction (Bak, Tang, and Weisenfeld, 1988), and financial 
stress testing (Sorge, 2004) have shifted their focus from searching for analytic 
descriptions of aggregate behavior to numerical simulations based on componential 
rules.
Limitations and Boundaries
Numerical simulations iteratively apply simple rules to explore a complex 
system, and numerical simulation is itself an iterative process. The first models are 
relatively simplistic, and mostly intend to demonstrate that simulating the system is 
possible and a viable avenue for research. Once the original model has been created and 
accepted, future researchers add more sophisticated features over time (Gilbert & Terna, 
2000). Because this study will contain the first attempt at modelling allocation effects of 
school choice programs in an agent-based model, it will expectedly be simple. Future 
iterations, though, will add more detailed componential rules to fill in and supplant the 
rough approximations in this model.
Organization of the Dissertation
This dissertation will be divided into five chapters. This chapter has described 
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the problem, its importance, and given an overview of how I approach its solution. 
Chapter 2 will describe the literature about the cost of school choice programs and about 
numerical simulation in the economics of education. Chapter 3 will describe the 
selection of a school district to model and the construction of the series of computer 
models used to estimate the cost of a hypothetical school choice program. Chapter 4 will 
describe the output of the computer model constructed in chapter 3 and the meaning of 
these outputs as results of the study. Chapter 5 will discuss the cost of the hypothetical 
school choice program and the applicability of this technique for future use in 
ascertaining the cost of education programs for policy makers.
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CHAPTER 2: Literature Review
Introduction
In this section I will provide an overview of the literature that pertains to the 
study that I propose. The first section describes the argument that underlies the rationale 
for school choice programs. In this first portion I will describe how the efficient-market 
hypothesis spawned the idea that schools need to operate in a competitive market in 
order to function efficiently. I will then show how this political philosophy became 
confused for a complete statement of the economic impact of school choice programs. 
The discussion of the broad body of literature will conclude with a more nuanced 
economic analysis of school choice programs that accounts for the impact of allocation 
effects on the economies of scale that schools rely on. The literature chosen for this 
section is not meant to exhaustively cover all of the studies that pertain to the economics 
of school choice programs, but rather to provide a representative sample rich enough to 
explain the argument that surrounds school choice programs.
I will also discuss the body of literature that lies nearest my study: the use of 
computer simulation in the analysis of education programs, with special focus on 
simulations that estimate economic impacts or school choice programs. The first area of 
literature discussed here, using simulations to explore Tiebout equilibriums under 
different voucher programs, offers a particularly good example of how simulations can 
assist in economic analysis and how simulations iteratively improve over time. But even 
more so, this literature shows how simulations shift the theorist’s focus from trying to 
describe aggregate behavior to describing componential behavior and letting a computer 
simulate the aggregate behavior. This discussion will conclude with some examples of 
A COMPUTER SIMULATION OF SCHOOL DISTRICT ECONOMICS 17
simulations used for other analyses in education that I have chosen because they 
demonstrate some important elements of approaching simulation and constructing a 
simulation well.
Economic Theory of School Choice Programs
The literature that explores the costs of school choice programs falls in two 
camps. One area of the literature focuses on the funding sources for schools. This body 
of literature exists more in the public policy arena than in peer-reviewed journals, but 
still represents an important perspective in the American education debate. The other 
area of literature focuses on producing cost estimates for use in cost-effectiveness and 
cost-feasibility analysis. This discussion represents the bulk of the academic literature, 
but is often too complicated to receive thorough treatment in the public policy arena.
Market Pressure in Education
To understand the argument about the cost of school choice programs, one must 
first understand the mechanism assumed to underlie their advantage. Proponents 
suppose school choice will improve the education system by subjecting all schools to 
more competitive pressure, which they contend will incent schools to use resources 
more efficiently and thereby improve educational outcomes. This competitive pressure 
comes from letting parents choose which institution receives the government money 
allotted for their children, a mechanism commonly referred to as “the money follows the 
child.” Some advocates erroneously assume that the mechanism of school choice 
completely describes the cost of the programs. This section will discuss the mechanism 
of school choice; an overview of attempts to describe the real cost of school choice 
programs will follow.
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Early Rationales for School Choice
References to education systems that allow parents to direct government money 
for the education of their children can be traced back as far as Thomas Paine (Fishman, 
1983). Paine’s (1791) rationale for what would become known as school choice in “The 
Rights of Man” was principally egalitarian; he argued that quality education was out of 
reach for students in low economic classes, and a negative tax specifically created for 
the purchase of education services could help low income families increase their access 
to education. Educating poor children would benefit society in the long run: “the number 
of poor will hereafter become less, because their abilities, by the aid of education, will 
be greater” (Paine, 1791, chapter 5, part 5). The advent of free, compulsory education in 
the United States renders Paine’s egalitarian argument largely moot, although access to 
education remains far from equal to students in different socioeconomic backgrounds 
(Biddle & Berliner, 2002).
The idea of school choice was reintroduced by the economist Milton Friedman 
as an abstract statement of economic theory and philosophy, more than education policy 
(Fox, 2011). Friedman (1955) proposed two reasons for enacting school choice. First, he 
believed market forces would allow the private sector to find ways to spend educational 
resources more efficiently than the government-administered public school system. 
Friedman’s second reason for promoting school choice lies more in the realm of political 
philosophy than economic policy: the government takes on three roles in providing 
public education, only two of which are appropriate. He asserts that the government 
should (a) set standards and goals for education and (b) fund its provision. Friedman 
claims, however, that capitalist economic theory suggests that the third role, (c) actually 
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administering the education system, should fall to the private sector instead of the 
government.
Creating a Marketplace of Education
Friedman viewed the benefit of market forces abstractly in terms of “more 
efficient utilization of their resources” (Friedman, 1955, p. 9) but offered no specific 
vision of how increased efficiency would benefit students. The proposition that an 
education system will respond positively to participating in a competitive market 
requires the explication of two underlying premises. First, monopolies allow 
inefficiencies because they have no incentive to remove them; existing inefficiencies 
allow the system to produce smaller outputs than could be produced by the inputs in a 
perfect system. Liebenstein (1966) first labeled this diminished output as “X-
inefficiency” and defined it as the increase in price compared to outputs that result when 
firms operate in the absence of “competition and adversity [that] create some pressure 
for change” (p. 408). Second, public schools maintain a partial monopoly over 
consumers of education. Few communities have school choice programs of sufficient 
size to threaten public school systems with significant competitive pressure (Hoxby, 
2003). Even in the absence of school choice programs, however, public schools do not 
hold a true monopoly in education: the presence of private schools allows some parents 
to exercise some choice. Additionally, the ability of families to relocate to a different 
neighborhood allows consumers to choose education other than that provided by their 
neighborhood school (Dougherty et al., 2009). Despite these options, most consumers 
use the “free” education provided by their neighborhood public school, and 
consequently these neighborhood schools do not compete in a truly open market to a 
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great extent.
The literature offers direct evidence that the public education system operates 
below maximum efficiency (Hoxby, 2003; Eppel & Romano, 2008). Partially inefficient 
operation of public schools is so well accepted that it has become an accepted premise in 
other areas of education research as well. A recent debate has raged about the utility of 
cost functions in determining funding levels for education (see Costrell, Hanushek, & 
Loeb (2008) and Duncombe (2006) for examples of both sides of this argument). 
Despite differing perspectives, the two camps agree on the appropriateness of including 
a variable in the cost functions to approximate how efficiently schools use their 
resources—indicating wide agreement that public schools do not operate at maximum 
efficiency. The efficiency variable is included to account for the fact that public schools 
do not participate in a “competitive market,” but rather in “the very different 
environment of public education” (Costrell, Hanushek, & Loeb, 2008, p. 207).
Effects of Market Pressure on Schools
Theoretical descriptions of the possible mechanisms for using choice to improve 
educational outcomes in public schools began to arise as early as the 1970s. Jencks 
(1970) posited that an education system can maintain teacher quality either through 
bureaucratic means such as training and academic requirements, or through the market 
by allowing well-informed parents to choose schools with better teachers. Schools 
providing services valued by the market will maintain enrollment levels because parents 
choose to send students to them; the schools not providing sufficient educational value 
to attract enough students will decline and the market will ultimately cull them. Jencks 
goes on to argue that education is nuanced, in contrast with heavy-handed bureaucratic 
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requirements, so the market approach will more responsively ensure teacher quality. 
Modern analyses of the effect of competition due to school choice on the quality of 
public schools is mixed. Some research shows that the presence of a sufficiently large 
school choice program does produce measurable increases in the educational output of 
the public schools in the area (Hoxby, 2003), while Barrow & Rouse (2008) found no 
evidence of improvement in public schools as a result of voucher programs in 
Washington, D.C., Dayton, Ohio, and New York City. Such discussion of whether 
market pressure actually improves education is interesting and important, but falls 
outside the scope of this paper.
What the School Choice Mechanism Is and Isn’t
The economic rationale for school choice described by economists primarily 
concerns reducing X-inefficiency by inducing the education system to function more 
like a firm in an open market. Some school choice advocates, however, have taken the 
idea that “the money follows the child” to mean that school choice programs are cost 
neutral. Consider the following quote taken from the Frequently Asked Questions 
section of a school choice advocacy group:
The financial effects of vouchers, even vouchers for the full per-pupil 
expenditure of public schools, should be negligible. For every decrease in 
the amount of funds directed at public schools, there would be a 
commensurate reduction in the work load and hence costs of operating 
public schools. (Coulson, 1998)
This statement specifically references vouchers, but the underlying idea would apply 
equally to any school choice program. The school choice advocates who indicate that 
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letting funding follow the child is a cost-neutral plan, as compared to a spending-neutral 
plan, mistake accounting costs for economic costs. Levin and McEwan (2001) explained 
that “the assumption that [budgets] will contain all the cost information that is needed is 
usually erroneous.” (p. 45) Budgets serve useful functions, but they do not, and are not 
intended to, offer a complete picture of a program’s costs.
Removing a Small Number of Students
School choice programs, at least as they have been proposed and implemented at 
present, often remove a small number of students from a relatively large number of 
classrooms. One impact of these so called “allocation effects” (Hoxby, 2003) is a 
disruption of an economy of scale that allows schools to operate efficiently. Other 
researchers have examined different aspects of estimating the costs of school choice 
programs. The final analysis of the cost of school choice programs will have to 
synthesize all of these findings, but that is not the task undertaken here. This paper aims 
to improve estimates of the costs associated with the impact of allocation effects on 
capacity utilization.
According to Goldhaber’s (1999) analysis of proposed universal voucher 
programs, because some vouchers would go to parents who already choose to pay for 
private school tuition, “most of the benefits would go to those who are already in private 
schools. To offset this, vouchers could be made progressive by targeting the voucher to 
low-income families” (p. 23). Recent voucher programs seem to follow this course: all 
of the large-scale voucher programs implemented or ongoing in 2007 have been made 
available to only some students in the district. The selection process was based on 
socioeconomic targeting, special education status, quality of the student’s original public 
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school, lottery, or a combination of those factors (Barrow & Rouse, 2008).
Extant school choice programs impact only a small fraction of students. Large 
charter school programs have been in place for more than a decade, but even charter 
schools educate a small portion of this nation’s students. Michigan’s charter school 
program is regarded as one of the best and most expansive in the nation (Chakrabarti & 
Roy, 2011), yet only about 7% of Michigan’s school-age children attend these schools 
(Michigan Department of Education, 2010). Minnesota, which also has a prominent 
charter school system, enrolls less than 5% of its students in charter schools (Minnesota 
Department of Education, 2011). These figures exceed the national average for charter 
school enrollment of 3.3% (National Center for Education Statistics, 2011).
Some question what types of students comprise the small numbers participating 
in school choice programs. While evidence that higher aptitude students self-select into 
school choice programs (“cream skimming”) has not been found, as was at one time 
predicted (for example Jencks, 1970), studies in several fields have found that low-cost 
students—those students who require relatively few resources from their school—self-
select into private schools and charter schools in school choice programs, likely because 
private and charter schools have little incentive to attract high-cost students (West, 
Ingram, & Hind, 2006; Biglaiser & Ma, 2003).
Inelasticity of Educational Costs for Small Enrollment Changes
Like predictions of cream skimming, claims of cost neutrality have also attracted 
scrutiny in the literature. Revenue will decrease in proportion to the decrease in 
enrollment, assuming vouchers equal to the full per pupil expenditure, but costs will not; 
the school will operate less efficiently and have fewer educational resources for the 
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students who remain in the school. Scafidi (2012), a school choice advocate constructing 
the argument for later refutation, concisely described the position as follows:
The claim is that when a child leaves [his or her former public school] via 
school choice that the public school retains significant fixed costs. A 
decrease in students means that there is less money to spend on these 
large fixed costs of operating a school. So, if students leave and these 
costs are truly fixed and must be paid in order for the school to operate, 
then the students who remain in public schools will have fewer resources 
devoted to their education. (p. 3)
The argument made by Yeh and acknowledged by Scafidi relies on the idea that some 
costs of operating a school are fixed, in that they do not depend on enrollment, and some 
costs vary directly with enrollment. A school might have a budget of D dollars that 
covers operating costs and an enrollment of n students; some school choice advocates 
(e.g., Coulson, 1998) apparently assume that each student costs D/n dollars to educate 
and removing a single student from the school would decrease both revenue and 
operating cost by D/n dollars. Assuming that all students require equivalent educational 
resources, the presence of fixed costs in operating a school requires that the marginal 
cost of educating one additional student is less than D/n dollars, so revenue would 
decrease by D/n dollars and operating costs would also decrease, but by a smaller 
amount.
The presence of fixed costs in operating a school has been widely, though 
perhaps not universally, accepted for decades, going back at least to the 1960s (Riew, 
1966), and educational research in many areas relies on this assumption. In his seminal 
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work on the optimal size of a high school, Kenny (1982) described “the level of 
‘effective’ schooling input per pupil (v)” as
v = k ( s π - 1) (p. 3) (2.1)
where k is the instructional input per student, and s is the number of students in the 
school, and π is the economy of scale coefficient. Kenny goes on to measure π 
empirically and finds that it takes on a value between 1.1 and 1.2. Any value of π greater 
than 1.0 indicates that larger high schools operate more efficiently. Recent updates to 
Kenny’s research by Ferris and West (2004) confirmed that an economy of scale exists 
in terms of educational productivity, but may be offset by increases in school violence 
with school size. This behavior agrees with the model of school finance that includes 
fixed costs: continuing the example from above, the marginal cost of an additional 
student is less than D/n dollars, but that student brings in D/n dollars in additional 
revenue. Looking at this example through the lens of Kenny’s findings, that surplus 
money can then go toward purchasing additional educational benefit for the students in 
the school which would increase the level of effective schooling as school size 
increases.
Even many school choice advocates acknowledge that schools have fixed costs. 
Consider the following quote from a policy document written for two voucher advocacy 
groups:
School districts could be financially harmed if the dollar amount of 
vouchers exceeds the variable cost of educating each student. If this 
occurs, each departing school choice student will take some of the funds
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used to educated [sic] remaining students in the district. (Gottlob, 2004, 
p. 3)
The suggestion that vouchers would be set at or below the variable cost of educating a 
single student is a limited solution to the problems caused by allocation effects of school 
choice programs. This mechanism would not be available for other types of school 
choice programs like charter schools and open enrollment. Moreover, one might 
question if schools will still feel the competitive pressure that is assumed to result from 
school choice if the budgetary impact is designed not to financially harm schools as 
students transfer away as part of a school choice program.
Allocation effects of school choice programs diminish the economies of scale 
that exist in schools and create inefficient operation. These inefficiencies lead to costs in 
the form of reduced value provided to the students by the schools; but who bears these 
costs? Yeh (2007) described the result as follows: “[T]he reduction in revenue associated 
with declining enrollment is typically offset by reducing other services—art, music, 
extracurricular programs and other support services.” Studies of how schools and 
districts respond to shrinking budgets confirm that districts will both cut teaching and 
aide positions, and they will eliminate programs such as fine arts and counseling 
(Jarman & Boyland, 2011). Thus the recipients of these services lose value otherwise 
provided by the school. The school’s budget must remain balanced, and thus the value of 
these services lost by the students will not appear on accounting documents. Using 
Levin and McEwan’s (2001) ingredients method of determining the cost of a program, 
these losses of value count as costs to participants, and so represent a real cost of the 
school choice program.
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Sensitivity of Cost Categories
The costs of operating a school fall into three categories: fixed costs, variable 
costs, and step costs. Some costs of running a school are fixed with respect to 
enrollment in that they do not depend on the number of students at the school. Some 
costs vary with respect to enrollment in that they depend directly on the number of 
students at the school. Scafidi (2012) introduced a third category of costs into the 
description of school budgets from an accounting textbook by Horngren et al. (2009) 
referred to as ‘step costs’, which
remain the same over various ranges of the level of activity, but the cost 
increases by discrete amounts—that is, increases in steps—as the level of the 
activity increases from one range to the next. (Horngren et al., 2009, p. 353 cited 
in Scafidi, 2012, p. 8)
At least one substantial cost in operating a school, faculty salaries, might behave like a 
step cost. Yeh (2007) argued that allocation effects caused by school choice programs 
“would not [allow] any of the public school building principals to eliminate teaching 
positions in response to the transfers” (p. 426). This statement assumes that the numbers 
of students that transfer are not large enough to allow faculty spending to move from its 
current level to a lower step. For example, suppose 80 students are taught in four 
classrooms by teachers with equal salaries, and a school choice program begins 
removing one student at a time. Because we will assume that 79 students will also 
require four classrooms and four teachers, removing one student will not allow the 
number of teachers to decrease. The total cost of the teachers’ salaries will remain 
constant as the students transfer out until enough students have left for the classes to be 
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consolidated from four to three under the school’s class size guidelines. At that point the 
faculty spending will be reduced to 75% of its initial value. The cost of faculty for this 
grade level thus exhibits step-cost behavior in that it remains fixed for some range of 
enrollment and, when the enrollment changes to a value outside of that range, the cost 
makes a large step to a new value that will remain fixed for a new range. See Figure 2.1 
for a pictorial representation of this idea.
In addition to the intuitive description of faculty spending as step costs, 
empirical evidence in support of this comes from Heinesen’s (2004) study of the 
relationship between enrollment and spending in Denmark. Heinesen’s work confirmed 
that spending is partially inelastic with respect to enrollment, specifically “if the number 
of pupils falls by 1% from one year to the next, expenditure per pupil increases by 
0.8%” (p. 443). In other words, a 1% decline in enrollment only leads to a 0.2% decline 
in expenditure. This study also finds that spending is less elastic with respect to 
enrollment decreases than enrollment increases due to “capacity utilization effects” (p. 
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443). (Classrooms and teachers make up capacity in a school; efficiently utilizing 
resources in education means keeping staffed classrooms as full as possible.) Heinesen’s 
observation that enrollment increases lead to changes in spending more often than 
enrollment decreases can be understood in terms of step costs and capacity utilization: 
Because school districts use capacity efficiently, classrooms tend to be relatively full, 
and enrollment is thus closer to the high-enrollment end of the step; see Figure 2. 
Adding just a few more students will push the enrollment out of the step’s range. To the 
extent that enrollment lies near the high end of the step, it will lie farther from the low 
end of the step, so more students would have to leave before enrollment would fall 
outside of the range of the current step and inside the range of the lower step.
Figure 2.2 Similar to Figure 2.1, but also showing the smallest enrollment increase that 
would lead to a faculty cost increase, and the smallest enrollment decrease that would 
lead to a faculty cost savings. Notice that the enrollment (E) lies closer to the high-
enrollment end of the step than to the low-enrollment end, this indicates that the school 
described with this figure uses its capacity (i.e., teachers and classrooms) efficiently. 
Because of this, the change in enrollment required to move to the higher faculty cost 
step is smaller than that required to move to the next lower step. Note that any decrease 
in enrollment that will not allow faculty spending to move to the next lower step will 
reduce the efficiency of capacity utilization and increase the per-student cost of 
operating the school.
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The discussion so far has tacitly focused on the immediate cost of allocation 
effects, and has not addressed long term impacts. Little research has studied how long it 
takes a district to regain efficiency lost due to the allocation effects of school choice 
programs, or even to regain efficiency lost due to enrollment declines more generally. 
Cibulka (1983) analyzed ten urban districts that experienced enrollment decline during 
the late 1970s and found that efficiency is often not entirely regained, and to the extent 
that the system does find a new, efficient equilibrium it does so slowly and with 
considerable time lag. Unfortunately, Cibulka’s findings offer no direct answers that 
apply to this discussion, but they do indicate that the answer will not be simple. The 
step-cost-based perspective described in this section could theoretically apply to longer 
time scales (e.g., by iteratively applying the model using the output from year t - 1 as the 
input for year t), but longitudinal analysis of allocation effects must necessarily begin 
with a valid model of immediate effects. Because a model of immediate effects must 
precede a model of effects over time, this discussion will continue with a focus on 
immediate effects.
Using Computer Simulation to Estimate Costs in Education
The advent of computers offered an economical way for researchers to approach 
complicated systems and diminished the need to consider mathematical feasibility when 
deciding what features to include in the model. This tradition of inquiry has made 
limited headway into the economics of education. I will discuss three categories of 
computer simulations used in modelling education programs: numerical solutions to 
complicated analytical equations, numerical solutions to equations developed with 
simulations in mind, and agent-based simulations. These three categories of simulation 
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exist in two sub-bodies of literature that reside very near the study that I propose. The 
first set of articles represent the only literature I could find that uses simulations to 
explore vouchers. The second body of literature consists of studies that use simulation in 
other areas of education. I choose to include these as important for a variety of reasons 
(e.g., exemplars of a particular reason for using simulation, the use of cost-benefit 
analysis, etc). 
Simulations that estimate the impact of vouchers
Epple and Romano (1998) developed an analytic general equilibrium model to 
show the impact of private schools in a generalized school district on public school 
quality and housing prices. Their model begins with an assumption that households have 
some amount of financial resources, and a child of some academic ability. Households 
weigh the utility they would obtain from each school in a district against how much they 
would have to pay—either in housing and taxes for public schools or in tuition for 
private schools. Households then choose their school so that they maximize their utility. 
As households relocate, though, housing prices and tax rates change, as do school 
qualities. An equilibrium—technically known as a Tiebout equilibrium (Tiebout, 1956)
—exists when no household could find more utility by relocating or changing schools.
The analytic statement of the equilibrium developed in this work relies on a large 
number of assumptions that make the math possible. For example, the relationship 
between utility, U, that a household will find at a school, the household’s after-tax 
income, yt, and the school’s average quality of students (θ), is assumed to satisfy the 
following relationship:
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 (p. 37) (2.2)
Simply stated, this condition indicates that the utility that a family obtains in a school is 
more sensitive to the quality of its student’s peers for higher-income families. Or using 
Epple and Romano’s words, “for students of the same ability, any indifference curve in 
the (θ, p)-plane of a higher-income household cuts any indifference curve of a lower-
income household from below” (Epple & Romano, 1998, p. 37). The p in the previous 
explanation indicates an amount of private school tuition. Statements like this represent 
an attempt by the theorist to deduce aggregate behavior from componential rules by 
making powerful simplifications. 
The analytic section of Epple and Romano’s (1998) paper ends with the 
conclusion that a Tiebout equilibrium will exist in districts under reasonable 
assumptions and no vouchers. They then describe some general, provable conclusions 
about these equilibria in the absence of vouchers. For example, “the public sector [will 
have] the lowest-ability peer group” (Epple and Romano, 1998, pp. 40-41). Analytical 
proof of equilibria in the presence of vouchers cannot be deduced, however. The 
equilibrium equations cannot be solved analytically for voucher conditions, so the 
authors turn to a “computational model . . . to examine vouchers, and to explore issues 
for which comparative-static analysis may yield ambiguous results” (Epple and Roman, 
1998, p. 45). The simulation described is simple compared to Nechyba (1999) and 
Nechyba (2000). The model ignores housing values in different neighborhoods, and 
instead treats all of the public schools in a district as one large school that contains all 
students not in a private school. Each household determines the utility of each school 
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using the equation
U = (yt - p)θ0.06b0.3 (p. 46) (2.3)
where U, yt, p, and θ are as described above, and b is the ability of the child in the 
household. The cost function for schools is set by
C(k) = F + V(k) = 12 + 1,300k + 13,333k2 (p. 46) (2.4)
where C is the cost of running a school and k is the percentage of students in the district 
who attend the school. Private schools are assumed to act as non-profit entities, so the 
cost of running the school is divided among the students attending that school and 
charged as tuition. A large number of households are created with values for yt and b 
chosen from a distribution, with b for each household depending somewhat on yt, 
indicating that household income and student ability are correlated. In each iteration, 
each household determines the utility it would derive from each existing school, and 
from a hypothetical new private school. If any household would derive more utility by 
enrolling in a different school, they do so. Equilibrium is reached when no household 
can increase its utility by transferring schools, and no new private school would attract 
enough students to survive if created.
The authors conduct a sensitivity analysis because “scant empirical evidence 
exists on some important parameters of the model” (Epple and Romano, 1998, p. 45). In 
the case of the correlation between household income and student ability, ρ, little direct 
evidence exists. The authors took some tangentially-related evidence and set the high 
end of ρ at 0.4, based on the argument that no evidence can be found to suggest that ρ 
could be any higher. They conducted a sensitivity analysis and found that “[i]ncreasing ρ 
from 0 to 0.4 reduces public-sector attendance [from 90%] to 88%” and they continue 
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on to use ρ = 0 for the remainder of the analysis because the specific value of ρ has 
relatively little impact.
Because the simulation developed in this study is relatively juvenile, Epple and 
Romano candidly point out the aspects that would most benefit from more sophisticated 
development. The only factor considered in this analysis that captures the value of 
education is increased lifetime earnings for the students who attend better schools. The 
authors point out “longer-run externalities from education not considered by private 
schools, like reduced crime, may be present” (Epple & Romano, 1998, p. 44). Another 
area for improvement in this study concerns the impact of teachers. The authors point 
out that the model could “let teachers vary in skill with student achievement increasing 
in both the school’s teacher-student ratio and the mean skill of the teachers” and 
“[a]llowing a teachers utility  to depend also on the skills of colleagues” (Epple & 
Romano, 1998, p. 55). The final area for acknowledged shortcoming of this simulation 
pertains to the public schools in the model. “The public sector is passive in this model 
for simplicity. Public-sector schools do not segment students by ability (track), increase 
educational inputs to compete more effectively with the private sector, or behave 
strategically in any way” (Epple & Romano, 1998, p. 38). In reality, though, public 
schools do track students as a way of catering to higher ability individuals (Epple, 
Figlio, & Romano, 2004), and this practice would influence the perceived peer quality in 
public schools.
Nechyba has published several studies of the impact of vouchers on Tiebout 
equilibria based on numerical simulation (for example, Nechyba, 1999; Nechyba, 2000). 
I have selected these two examples for their thoroughness and representativeness, and 
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because they demonstrate a shift in the focus of the study by the author. Nechyba (1999) 
follows a pattern similar to Epple and Romano (1998): a thorough and detailed formal 
analysis of analytical equations seeking the aggregate behavior of schools in a district 
followed by a smaller section devoted to a numerical simulation. Unlike Epple and 
Romano (1998), Nechyba (1999) places households into different communities. Each 
community contains its own schools of some quality, its own tax rate, and its own 
housing prices. Agents in the simulation can choose a community and either enroll their 
child in the public school or pay tuition at a private school in such a way that their utility 
is maximized. Utility is defined in a way much like Epple and Romano (1998), except 
that now the households must also consider the quality of the house they live in.
Like Epple and Romano (1998), Nechyba (1999) turns to a numerical simulation 
because of “the complexity of the model described. Without making some specific 
assumptions … there seems little chance of deriving predictable implications.” (p. 17) 
The rationale for Nechyba’s use of a simulation in this article indicates a theoretical 
framework different than mine. “We therefore think of the work that follows as an 
extension of theoretical work with more specific functional form assumptions” (p. 17). 
Instead of using simulation to free the theorist from the boundaries of the analytical 
work as described by Ostrom (1988), Nechyba, like Epple and Romano (1998), uses it 
merely to solve intractable math problems at the end of an analytical inquiry.
The process of constructing the simulation used by Nechba (1999) begins with 
creating three communities and a set of house types that populate those communities. 
Households then populate the houses with randomly assigned incomes and child 
abilities; before any private schools or voucher programs are added, the households are 
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allowed to iteratively relocate until the system reaches an equilibrium. Once the system 
reaches this first stage of equilibrium, tax policy is set in each community based on the 
desires of the median voter, and the system again relaxes into equilibrium. Once in this 
second equilibrium, the rules change by allowing private schools to exist and possibly 
introducing a voucher system, and the system evolves until it reaches a third 
equilibrium. Like Epple and Romano (1998), Nechyba (1999) reports few quantitative 
outcomes from these simulations. Instead, the results focus on qualitative descriptions, 
i.e., that “those choosing private schools in poor communities are not original . . . 
residents of those communities but rather are high income migrants” (p. 30). This 
process is then repeated with different funding laws—local financing, state funding, 
state foundation grants, and district power equalization. The analysis concludes with the 
outcomes of the third-level equilibrium under these different funding schemes; put 
briefly, the overall public school funding mechanism dramatically impacts the equity of 
voucher programs. District power equalization leads to the most equitable distribution of 
benefit from vouchers, and foundation grants lead to the greatest inequity.
In terms of one of the great themes of this study—that developing simulations is 
itself an iterative process—Nechyba (1999) shows substantial growth compared to 
Epple and Romano (1998). Much of this growth can be attributed to the function of real 
estate in the models. By not specifying neighborhoods and housing values, and by 
having only homogeneous public schools and a single tax rate, Epple and Romano 
tacitly assume that all households live in the same community. They reach some 
important conclusions about the manner of equilibrium reached with different kinds of 
vouchers by giving agents two choices: public or private. Nechyba (1999) includes 
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neighborhoods with varying quality houses and tax laws, so that agents in the model 
have two more choices: public, private, relocate and choose a public school, and relocate 
for a private school. Nechyba (1999) does not invalidate the conclusions drawn by Epple 
and Romano (1998). Instead, the improvements made in this model enrich and expand 
upon the work that went before it.
The final equilibrium model that I will discuss also comes from Nechyba (2000). 
In one sense, the simulation described is simply “a richer and more realistic model than 
used in prior work” (p. 131). But the improvements made for this simulation are of key 
interest here. The most obvious change is that of focus. This simulation intends to 
examine the impact of vouchers under different targeting schemes instead of public 
school funding schemes, like in Nechyba (1999). The overall structure of the model 
remains the same, with several rounds of creating communities and letting them relax 
into equilibrium prior to the introduction of private schools or vouchers. Once in this 
initial equilibrium, a voucher program is introduced that targets certain demographics or 
neighborhoods. After several rounds of this process with different voucher targeting 
schemes, the resulting equilibria are compared to each other.
A second difference pertains to the magnitude of the simulation. The model from 
Nechyba (1999) contains three districts, which each contain five neighborhoods full of 
similarly-priced houses. Each household has one of ten income levels, and a child of one 
of five ability levels. The product of these variables leads to a total of 750 types of 
agents at the beginning of the model. In contrast, the simulation developed in Nechyba 
(1999) only has 45 types of agents. This difference in scale does not indicate that the 
earlier work lacked value; it merely represents an early stage in the development of the 
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A third difference concerns the degree of calibration. The housing prices used to 
initialize the model come not from national data, like in Nechyba (1999), but from 
specific neighborhoods in the suburbs of New York City. Using data specific to a certain 
location increases the realism of the simulation, but detracts from its generalizability. In 
response to this potential challenge Nechyba attempts to regain some wider 
applicability, “while the calibration is using data from New York suburbs, it should be 
noted that I have run similar simulations calibrated to data from New York City, which 
yield similar results” (2000, p. 133). 
The most interesting difference from the perspective of the current study is the 
relative importance of the analytical section compared to the computational section. 
Epple and Romano (1998) develop a sophisticated analytical model for most of their 
discussion of equilibrium and turn to simulation to resolve some particulars when the 
math gets out of hand. Nechyba (1999) thoroughly pursued an analytical model, but paid 
approximately equal attention to the simulation, and even included several important 
features in the simulation (e.g., the public education funding model) that do not receive 
treatment in the analytical section. Nechyba (2000) focuses much more on the 
simulation than on the analytical model. The section that describes the model references 
prior work by the author (specifically, Nechyba (1999)), and discusses aggregate 
equilibrium in many of the same terms. Unlike Nechyba (1999), though, the description 
of the model also contains componential information like, “Parents . . . choose (i) where 
to live, (ii) whether to send their child to the local public or private school, and (iii) how 
to vote in local elections determining the level of public school spending.” Although 
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these ideas receive some analytical treatment, the explication of the model begins with a 
componential description, which indicates a shift away from the analytical mindset and 
toward the systems mindset that employs simulation as a primary method of inquiry.
Other simulations in education
Tengs, Osgood, and Chen (2001) used a simulation to conduct a cost-benefit 
analysis of a promising anti-tobacco program aimed at junior high school students. This 
article describes a high-quality simulation and provides insight into how to calibrate a 
simulation, how to use a sensitivity analysis when calibration is impossible, and 
thoroughly discusses the limits of the simulation and what improvements can be made in 
future iterations.
All simulations described in this review contain some treatment of calibration in 
which estimated quantities are stated and a reference is provided. Only Tengs, Osgood, 
and Chen (2001) indicate the importance of these assumptions by placing all estimated 
variables in a table along with their citations. The prominence of the calibration is 
further indicated by the fact that the table containing the calibrating estimates occurs on 
the second page of the article.
Some key parameters in the model received little direction from the literature or 
the literature indicated a wide range of estimated values. The literature suggested values 
for one such parameter, the effectiveness of anti-tobacco educational programs, that 
varied from 5% to 80% effective. Condensing that range down to a single-point estimate 
eliminates important variability in the system (Hertz, 1957). Instead of artificially 
collapsing the effectiveness estimate to a single point, the authors “decided to evaluate a 
wide range of possible scenarios” (Tengs, Osgood, & Chen, 2001). The anti-tobacco 
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program would be administered to 7th and 8th graders; the value of the effectiveness 
assumed in the simulation is drawn from the range suggested by the literature, and the 
simulation uses a different value of effectiveness for each year that the program is 
administered. Allowing the effectiveness of the program to vary from one year to the 
next accounts for normal variation within the school system (e.g., from teacher turnover, 
new cohorts of students, etc.). Using a range of values allows the authors to discuss 
different outcomes under conservative and hopeful assumptions.
Another aspect of this study that demonstrates the quality of the simulation is the 
sensitivity analysis. The sensitivity analyses were used “to better understand the impact 
of uncertain parameters on cost-effectiveness” (Tengs, Osgood, and Chen, 2001, p. 564). 
Unlike parameters for which a wide range of possible values are available (e.g., anti-
tobacco effectiveness), the literature offered little or no direction on some values, e.g., 
whether former smokers have health trajectories more like never smokers or current 
smokers. In this example, the authors parameterize health outcomes for former smokers 
to be some percent of the way from the health outcomes for never smokers toward the 
health outcomes for current smokers. To test the impact of this estimate on the final 
results, they “multiplied the differential between current and never smokers . . . with a 
constant α, to expand or shrink these differences” (Tengs, Osgood, and Chen, 2001, p. 
564). The multiplier α was chosen at random from a normal distribution centered at 1 
and with a standard deviation of 0.5 for each iteration; a value of 0 would totally 
eliminate the difference between never smokers and former smokers, and a value of 2 
would move the health outcomes twice as far toward current smokers as the authors 
initially assumed. The authors repeated this process 5,000 times, and reported the range 
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of outcomes for several confidence intervals.
The authors also discuss what specific aspects of the model they left out. Of 
particular theoretical importance, the simulation does not account for interaction 
between students. One might imagine that if a student’s classmates do not begin 
smoking, then the student would be even less likely to smoke. Thus the anti-tobacco 
program would prevent some students from smoking, which would reduce the 
likelihood that other students would smoke and make them more susceptible to the 
message of the anti-tobacco program, preventing them from smoking. Complexity 
theorists refer to this type of behavior in social systems as positive feedback (Rickles, 
Haw, and Shiell, 2007). The feedback loop in this system is positive because the output 
of the system (i.e., students choosing not to smoke) becomes the input for the system 
(i.e., students’ peers choosing not to smoke) in such a way as to amplify the behavior. 
Accounting for this feedback in analytical exploration would be challenging, but 
including the smoking behavior of a student’s peers as an input in the simulated 
student’s decision making would not likely pose an unreasonable challenge in a 
numerical simulation.
The final article that I will discuss does not involve vouchers or an agent-based 
simulation, but does demonstrate the difference between approaching research from an 
analytical mindset versus a simulation mindset. Marschke, Laursen, Nielsen, and Dunn-
Rankin (2007) undertook a study to examine the impact of policies aimed at equalizing 
the gender makeup of university faculties. Agent-based simulations must, as their 
category implies, be based on the behavior of an agent (Gilbert and Terna, 2000), and by 
this description the simulation in Marschke, Laursen, Nielsen, and Dunn-Rankin is not 
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agent-based. Instead, they adopt an aggregate approach, but from the beginning they 
assume that the equations they create cannot be solved longitudinally. The equations in 
this study use the value of a parameter (e.g., percentage of faculty that identifies as 
female during a certain year) to determine the change in that parameter (e.g., the 
percentage of new hires that identify as female in the next year). Equations that relate 
the change in a variable to its value are called differential equations, and very few types 
of differential equations are analytically tractable (Weidlich, 2002). The authors develop 
a system of differential equations that basically describes how the faculty in one year 
will become the faculty in the next year, but they never indicate that solving these 
equations for some future time is possible. Instead, they say that, “at each point in time, 
the faculty headcount is recalculated according to changes in the previous year that are 
themselves time-dependent” (Marschke, Laursen, Nielsen, and Dunn-Rankin, 2007, p. 
9). A computer takes the state information for one year, and uses it to compute the state 
for the next year, then uses that information to compute the state for the year after, and 
so on. 
The importance of this methodological approach and the theoretical perspective 
that justifies it is that it allows the model to include feedback loops, described by 
Rickles, Haw, and Shiell (2007) as important elements of complex systems. The authors 
identify an inertia in the gender composition of university faculties, “new hires are more 
likely to be women if the overall percentage of women is already relatively high” 
(Marschke, Laursen, Nielsen, and Dunn-Rankin, 2007, p. 3). The use of differential 
equations solved year to year by a computer allows the authors to explore theoretical 
features of their system that would be impossible from within the analytical mindset.
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Summary
The literature that I have described here grounds the argument about school 
choice programs, what they cost, and why they might work. Some believe that schools 
must participate in competitive markets if they are to use their resources efficiently. 
Others mistakenly extend this argument and assume that if the money follows the child, 
the monetary inputs required by the education system will not increase or decrease, so 
the cost will remain the same. Many authors critique the assumption that school choice 
programs are cost neutral by pointing out, among other things, that allocation effects 
damage the economies of scale that schools rely on and reduce the value received by the 
students remaining in public schools.
I have also provided some examples of how simulations can help researchers 
explore the economics of education, including an area of the literature devoted to using 
simulation to explore Tiebout equilibrium in communities with both public and private 
schools. Comparing earlier models to later ones demonstrates how simulations 
iteratively develop over time. Once a model has been developed and shown useful, 
future authors can add richer behavior and more detailed calibration to improve the 
results of the simulations and allow it to enlighten a broader range of questions. 
Additionally, beginning a study with simulation in mind allows the theorist to consider a 
grander view of the behavior of the model, because only componential behavior needs to 
be described mathematically.
Conclusion
I searched Google Scholar using all combinations of the phrases (a) education, 
school, school district with the phrases (b) simulation, numerical model, computational 
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model and the phrases (c) school choice, voucher, charter school, allocation effects. 
Many of the results I have described came from these searches, but I found no study 
within these searches that used numerical simulation to estimate the economic impact of 
allocation effects that arise due to school choice programs. Because some researchers 
conducting cost-effectiveness and cost-benefit analysis of school choice programs make 
assumptions about these economic impacts (e.g., Yeh, 2007; Yeh, 2010), finding better 
estimates of them using simulation will close an important gap in the literature.
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CHAPTER 3: Methods
Introduction
I have described disagreement in the literature and in popular discourse about 
whether faculty costs should be viewed as fixed or variable in response to small 
enrollment changes. More technically, disagreement exists about how sensitively faculty 
costs, when viewed as step costs, can respond to small enrollment changes. As a result, I 
propose the following research questions:
(1) Can the resources (computing power, level of detail of data and information, 
etc.) available to practicing evaluators generate useful predictions of the costs of 
school choice programs?
(2) How sensitive are faculty costs to enrollment changes caused by school 
choice programs?
(3) How much will a proposed school choice program cost due to inefficiencies 
created by allocation effects?
Beyond the obvious value of answering these questions, answering them with numerical 
simulation will also help practitioners in the field of cost estimation in education 
become more comfortable with an approach and a tool set commonly used in other 
fields.
This chapter will describe the methods I will use to answer these research 
questions. I will begin by discussing a simplified version of the simulation that will help 
readers understand the process of conceptualizing, creating, and running a simulation. I 
will then describe both the general type of data that can create the initial state of a 
simulation like this, and the actual data I used in creating this simulation. Finally, I will 
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cover the rules that govern the behavior of a simulation both generally and in detail 
about this research .
Study Design
Previous studies that have explored the relationship between enrollment and the 
cost of providing education are based on regression using many years of data (Chibulka, 
1983; Heinesen, 2004). Using regression to analyze this data compares one year’s 
enrollment and some metric (i.e., faculty size) to other years’ enrollments and metrics. 
The trouble with this approach is that the signal of small enrollment declines due either 
to random variation or to school choice programs might get swamped by the noise of 
larger enrollment changes due to such factors as long-term demographic shifts, school 
openings or closings, changes in budgeting, school reform movements, etc. If we 
suppose that small enrollment declines function differently than large enrollment 
declines, then systems with a mix of large and small enrollment changes cannot help us 
understand the impact of small enrollment changes.
Ultimately, we wish to know how small changes in one year’s enrollment will 
impact the faculty size during that same year in two parallel universes, one of which 
decided to implement a school choice program and the other did not. Because our 
interest lies in comparing a situation that exists to one that does not, building the entire 
system as a simulation offers the best method to address the research questions stated 
above.
The simulation that I will describe is based on the process of financial stress-
testing employed by economists to measure the fiscal soundness of banks. The stress-
testing models used in the financial world, as described by Sorge (2004), involve four 
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primary steps: (1) represent the current state of the system, (2) define the rules that 
govern how the components interact, (3) apply a counterfactual change to the 
components—this is the stress to the system—and allow the components to interact and 
respond, (4) examine the resulting state of the system. I will follow this model closely 
for steps one through three, but my approach to step four will differ. 
Sorge (2004) describes two methods of building a simulation of a financial 
system that economists might wish to stress-test. The first method involves constructing 
“hypothetical portfolios whose composition is intended to mimic the distribution of 
assets and risk exposures within a given financial system” (p. 4). The second method 
involves actual data, but this method is less common due to the unavailability of 
necessary information. Once the simulation has been created, the stress scenarios must 
be designed. Sorge (2004) offers the following summary,
the design of any stress scenario includ[es] the choice of the type of risks 
to analyse (market, credit, interest rate, liquidity, etc.), whether single or 
multiple risk factors are to be shocked, what parameter(s) to shock (prices, 
volatility, correlations), by how much (based on historical or hypothetical 
scenarios) and over what time horizon. (p. 4)
The value of using a simulation comes from examining the impact of what Sorge (2004) 
calls “second-round effects” and what complexity theorists call “feedback” (Manson, 
2001, p. 407). Once the shock has been applied to the system, the system will respond; 
the changes that occur during this response can themselves influence the system. These 
feedback effects are challenging to predict over short intervals, and essentially 
impossible to predict analytically over long intervals because complex systems exhibit 
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final state sensitivity to initial conditions (Grebogi, McDonald, Ott, and Yorke, 1983). 
Imperceptibly small changes in the initial state can be amplified during feedback loops, 
leading to obvious and dramatic differences in the end result; only simulation can help 
researchers explore this behavior.
Much of my proposed simulation will follow this basic structure. Instead of 
initializing the simulation with financial data, I will use enrollment data for an entire 
district; instead of, say, making interest rates more volatile, I will remove a small 
number of students from the district. My approach to stress-testing a school district will 
follow closely the framework described by Sorge (2004) as described so far, but I will 
take a different course in the final step. The final step in financial stress testing involves 
defining a condition in the response variable in which the system is said to be in “crisis” 
(Sorge, 2004, p. 3). The financial system uses a binary outcome of the stress-test: in 
crisis versus not in crisis. My study, on the other hand, will calculate the elasticity (as a 
continuous variable) of faculty reduction that results from the enrollment decline.
A Simplistic Description of the Simulation
To elucidate my proposed method of estimating the costs of school choice 
programs, I will propose a toy example. Consider a fantasy school district with ten 
schools each containing one grade and taught by generalist (i.e., not content-specific) 
teachers; see Table 3.1. This model is clearly simplistic; a version of this model that is 
useful beyond demonstration will have to mimic or describe the actual state of the district 
in much more detail. The names of the schools, School, are randomly chosen from a list 
of words representing letters in the alphabet.
A COMPUTER SIMULATION OF SCHOOL DISTRICT ECONOMICS 49
Table 3.1. The ten schools in the fantasy district. 
School
Hartle
Grant
Uptown
Wessex
Pond
Zebra
Icelandic
Juniper
Verona
Open
I can add a random number of students, Enroll, to each school, uniformly chosen 
from [100, 200]; see Table 3.2. The decision to add a purely random number of students 
is an important assumption in the model—and one not supported by the literature. In 
practice, the number of students in each grade for each school is publicly available in 
many districts, and so is easily obtainable by evaluators.
Now that each school has a number of enrolled students, I can use some rule to 
determine Faculty, the number of teachers each school will require. For this toy example, 
I will set the maximum class size rigidly at 25 students and use that rule to determine a 
faculty size for each school; see Table 3.3.
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Table 3.2. The school district with a random number of students in each school.
School Enroll
Hartle 115
Grant 179
Uptown 124
Wessex 145
Pond 134
Zebra 135
Icelandic 196
Juniper 177
Verona 191
Open 177
Total 1573
The rule of using a rigid maximum class size to determine the number of faculty 
likely fails to capture the intricacies of education in the real world, but it will suffice for 
this toy example. See chapter four for a description of how I will handle decisions about 
faculty size in the actual model.
The model at this point describes the initial state of the fantasy district. Now we 
can borrow the method from financial stress-testing and subject the district to an 
imaginary stress. In this model, the imaginary stress takes the form of removing students 
from a school, Students Removed, to participate in a school choice program. The district 
contains a total of 1573 students, and I will subject the model to a school choice program 
that randomly removes a total of 25 students. The decision to remove these students 
purely randomly is an important, and perhaps inappropriate, assumption; see chapter four 
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for coverage of how that assumption will be tested. Once the students are removed, I can 
calculate each school’s new enrollment, New Enroll; see Table 3.4.
Table 3.3. The school district including faculty employed at each school.
School Enroll Faculty
Hartle 115 5
Grant 179 8
Uptown 124 5
Wessex 145 6
Pond 134 6
Zebra 135 6
Icelandic 196 8
Juniper 177 8
Verona 191 8
Open 177 8
Total 1573 68
We can then use the same rule that we used to calculate how many teachers each 
school employs to calculate how many teachers each school would need if the school 
choice program were to take these students, New Faculty. Comparing this faculty size to 
the actual faculty size allows us to predict how many positions could be eliminated, 
Faculty Loss, given our assumptions; see Table 3.5. Notice that the school choice 
program leads to the elimination of three teaching positions due to the random removal 
of this specific group of students.
Removing a different selection of students randomly from the district described in 
Table 3.4 will lead to a different result; see Table 3.6. Notice that removing the same 
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number of students—but different specific students—leads to the elimination of one 
faculty positions; two fewer than in the previous example.
Table 3.4. The district after a counterfactual stress of removing students for a school 
choice  program.
School Enroll Faculty StudentsRemoved New Enroll
Hartle 115 5 2 113
Grant 179 8 4 175
Uptown 124 5 2 122
Wessex 145 6 3 142
Pond 134 6 3 131
Zebra 135 6 2 133
Icelandic 196 8 3 193
Juniper 177 8 3 174
Verona 191 8 1 190
Open 177 8 2 175
Total 1573 68 25 1548
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Table 3.5. The results of the stress-test: how many faculty positions can be eliminated as 
a result of the school choice program.
School Enroll Faculty StudentsRemoved New Enroll
New 
Faculty
Faculty 
Loss
Hartle 115 5 2 113 5 0
Grant 179 8 4 175 7 1
Uptown 124 5 2 122 5 0
Wessex 145 6 3 142 6 0
Pond 134 6 3 131 6 0
Zebra 135 6 2 133 6 0
Icelandic 196 8 3 193 8 0
Juniper 177 8 3 174 7 1
Verona 191 8 1 190 8 0
Open 177 8 2 175 7 1
Total 1573 68 25 1548 65 3
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Table 3.6. A different impact on faculty of counterfactually removing 25 students from 
the district. The students removed in this trial differ from the students removed in the trial 
described in Table 3.5.
School Enroll Faculty StudentsRemoved New Enroll
New 
Faculty
Faculty 
Loss
Hartle 115 5 2 113 5 0
Grant 179 8 3 176 8 0
Uptown 124 5 5 119 5 0
Wessex 145 6 1 144 6 0
Pond 134 6 0 134 6 0
Zebra 135 6 4 131 6 0
Icelandic 196 8 2 194 8 0
Juniper 177 8 1 176 8 0
Verona 191 8 4 187 8 0
Open 177 8 3 174 7 1
Total 1573 68 25 1548 67 1
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Table 3.7. The scenario described in Table 3.6, but with cost information.
School Fixed Costs Enroll Rev.
a Fac. Salaryb Serv. per Stu. 
Stu.
Rmvd
New 
Enroll
New 
Rev.a
New 
Fac.
Fac. 
Loss
New 
Salaryb
New 
SPS
Benefit/ 
Lost
Hartle $100 115 $805 5 $250 $3.96 2 113 $791 5 0 $250 $3.90 $6.09
Grant $100 179 $1,253 8 $400 $4.21 3 176 $1232 8 0 $400 $4.16 $8.38
Uptown $100 124 $868 5 $250 $4.18 5 119 $833 5 0 $250 $4.06 $14.11
Wessex $100 145 $1,015 6 $300 $4.24 1 144 $1008 6 0 $300 $4.22 $2.76
Pond $100 134 $938 6 $300 $4.01 0 134 $938 6 0 $300 $4.01 $0.00
Zebra $100 135 $945 6 $300 $4.04 4 131 $917 6 0 $300 $3.95 $11.85
Icelandic $100 196 $1,372 8 $400 $4.45 2 194 $1,358 8 0 $400 $4.42 $5.10
Juniper $100 177 $1,239 8 $400 $4.18 1 176 $1,232 8 0 $400 $4.16 $2.82
Verona $100 191 $1,337 8 $400 $4.38 4 187 $1,309 8 0 $400 $4.33 $10.47
Open $100 177 $1,239 8 $400 $4.18 3 174 $1,218 7 1 $350 $4.41 -$41.53
Total $1,000 1573 $11,011 68 $3,400 25 1548 $10,836 67 1 $3,350 $19.93
Note. All cost figures in this table are displayed in thousands of dollars. 
a Revenue columns assume a PPE of $7,000 
b Salary columns assume that each teacher receives $50,000 in total compensation.
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Figure 3.1. A histogram showing the relative frequency of eliminated faculty positions in 
1000 trials of removing a random set of 25 students from the fantasy district using the 
enrollment numbers shown in Tables 3.2-3.6.
Repeating this process 1000 times will allow us to create a histogram showing 
the frequency of faculty position eliminations with different groups of students 
randomly removed; see Figure 3.1.
Table 3.5 shows that the size of the district’s faculty will decrease by 4.4% (from 
68 teachers to 65 teachers) when enrollment declines by 1.6% (from 1573 students to 
1548 students), which indicates an elasticity ratio of 2.75. The 1.5% faculty reduction 
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(from 68 teachers to 67 teachers) shown in Table 6 (as a result of an identical 1.6% 
enrollment decline) indicates an elasticity ratio of 0.92. Recall that the example here is 
meant only to demonstrate the function of the model, so these elasticity ratios will not 
help us make policy decisions in the real world, but calculating elasticity ratios for many 
trials using actual enrollment data will create a meaningful frequency distribution (like 
the one shown in Figure 3.1) that I can use to address the first research question.
Addressing the second research question will require estimating financial figures 
like per pupil expenditure (PPE), faculty salaries, and fixed costs for schools. The money 
left over after paying the fixed costs and faculty costs is available to provide other 
educational services to the students. The accounting spreadsheet will use these figures to 
calculate the amount of money available to purchase services per student—this figure is 
shown as Serv. per Stu. or SPS in Table 3.7. Comparing the sum of the services available 
per student before and after the counterfactual stress of removing students for the school 
choice program will show the economic impact of the allocation effects caused by the 
school choice program. As with the process described above, I will iterate this simulation 
and create a frequency distribution of the costs to students. Repeating this process for 
different combinations of districts and school choice programs will allow me to address 
the second research question.
The Role of Time
Before leaving this toy model, I will offer some clarification about the role of 
time in this simulation. This simulation attempts to help us understand the first year of a 
new school choice program. I use words like “before” and “after” to compare the 
numbers of students and teachers in the district without the stress and with the stress. 
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But these words can be difficult to interpret because we often view school years—in 
terms of a student attending a school or a school employing a teacher—as existing as a 
discrete object. It may at first seem odd to discuss “before” and “after” in an indivisible 
chunk of time. I will offer two functionally identical ways of viewing these temporal 
terms, and then an argument that which perspective we choose has little impact on our 
final conclusions.
The words “before” and “after” can refer to different moments in time. The 
“before” moment in time could either be when teaching contracts are signed prior to the 
beginning of the school year or when long term estimates are created about school 
enrollment within a district. If the decision to implement a school choice program and 
its implementation come after that moment in time, then all future enrollment figures 
and faculty decisions would be “after” that process. The two examples of before and 
after described here might lead to different decision making: perhaps fewer or no 
teaching positions would be eliminated if those eliminations entailed changing contracts. 
I do not favor the strict temporal interpretation of time in this study, so I will not attempt 
to address those differences here.
The words “before” and “after” can also refer to before and after the hypothetical 
creation of a parallel universe that includes a school choice program in the district. 
When faced with a decision about a contentious policy like a school choice program, 
what policy makers want from research is a glimpse into two alternate futures. They can 
then compare the alternate futures and choose on the course of action that will place 
them in the more desirable future. This simulation attempts to do exactly that: describe a 
school district as it currently is with no school choice program, and as it might be with 
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one. I will take this perspctive in this paper, because it offers the most help to policy 
analysis.
However we view the words “before” and “after” in this study, they intend to 
describe the impact of implementing a school choice program. In this sense, the strict 
temporal perspective and the alternate future perspective would lead us to build largely 
identical simulations, so disagreement on this point should not change how we proceed.
Description of Data
The raw data for this simulation come from enrollment data and free/reduced 
lunch eligibility data from California in 2011. The enrollment data come from the 
Enrollment by School section of the California Department of Education website. The 
raw enrollment data contain a row for each race code in each grade of each public school 
in the state, 126,083 individual rows in total. These rows contain information about 1,026 
districts, and 10,216 schools.
The free/reduced lunch eligibility data come from the Student Poverty - FRPM 
Data section of the California Department of Education website. The raw free/reduced 
lunch data contain one row per school, each with the number of students eligible for free 
lunch and the number of students eligible for reduced lunch in that school.
The districts range in size from 1 school (in 223 districts) to 916 schools in the 
Los Angeles Unified school district. Because only districts with more than one school 
will exhibit different behavior in the second level of iteration (described below and in 
chapter four), the simulation described in this work will only use the 535 districts with 
more than one elementary school. I have two reasons for only using grades one through 
three in this simulation. First, the class size rules are the same for grades one through 
A COMPUTER SIMULATION OF SCHOOL DISTRICT ECONOMICS 60
three in California, but different in kindergarten and 4th grade (Gonzalez, 2013). Third, 
young elementary grades are more often taught by generalists instead of content area 
specialists. This means that elementary schools can theoretically more easily tailor their 
faculty size to enrollment, and thus have the greatest chance of responding to small 
enrollment declines. See the section on Generality in chapter five for a more thorough 
justification for decisions like this one.
Some explanations will benefit from using a single district as an example, in these 
cases I will use the Fallbrook Union Elementary school district in my examples. I chose 
this district because it has the smallest Mahalanobis distance to the centroid of the data (a 
Z-score of 0.000071) in terms of number of students and percent of students eligible for 
free lunch. In other words, this district is closest to average in terms of size and average 
socioeconomic status of all districts in California.
Anomalies and Data Cleaning Procedures
The data used in this simulation are not perfect. For example, 13.2% of districts 
have at least one school with more students eligible for free or reduced lunch than total 
students enrolled. The great majority of these anomalous schools fall into two categories. 
The first category involves schools that have, say 766 total students, but 767 students 
eligible for free or reduced lunch. The other type of anomalous datum is that of a 
category of student or a non-classroom education program, as opposed to an actual 
school. As stated above, the data for this study come from two sources, which alone may 
explain some of the discrepancy: the two data sources may have slightly different 
recording practices or definitions in the agencies that assemble the data. But it may also 
simply indicate the limit of precision of the individual measurements in these data. The 
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final example of seemingly erroneous data, which are very uncommon, come from 
individual schools for one reason or another. One such example has only a single student 
enrolled based on the enrollment data, but has 30 student eligible for free or reduced 
lunch based on the free/reduced lunch data. The school in this example, a charter school, 
opened the year these data were gathered, 2011. The particular circumstance surrounding 
the launching of a charter school may explain why two agencies have different records 
for that school during that year. I can only observe discrepancies between these data 
sources; any errors in the data that do not conflict with the other data source are not 
detectable, so this is the only type of error I could observe.
No information was removed from the raw data. Instead, a function in the code 
tested whether the data for a district contained any conflicts prior to executing the 
simulation on that district. If the district was found to contain any anomalies, that school 
was removed. Many of the anomalous entries in the district were non-school education 
programs, which were removed because they contain too few students; see the 
description of thinning in the Varying Policy Parameters section of chapter four. Because 
these entities would be removed in the thinning process, a negligible number of 
anomalies remained in the data when the function testing for them ran.
Creating the Initial State of the Simulation
Calibrating this simulation with information from the real world will fall into 
two tasks: creating the initial state, and describing the componential behavior. Of these 
two tasks, creating the initial state will pose fewer challenges than describing the 
componential behavior. In this section I will first offer a very abstract description of the 
initial state, which might be of use to future researchers creating a similar but not 
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identical simulation. I will then describe the data from California used in this simulation, 
and finally I will describe in detail how I turned those data into the initial state of this 
simulation.
A General Description of a Simulated District The fundamental object in this 
simulation is a district d containing a set of schools {s}, each of which contains its own 
set of 13 grades {gj}, and a set of students{q} who belong to grades in those schools, 
and a set of teachers {t} who teach in those schools. A student qijk  is the kth student in 
the jth grade in school si, and Qij represents the total size in the jth grade of school si. 
Similarly, Ti represents the total size of the teaching faculty at school si. Students and 
teachers in the district can be assigned various parameters as they become useful in the 
simulation; e.g., in this study I assigned each student a free lunch status, and each 
teacher a salary.
In practice, this simulated district could be created in a number of ways. I 
obtained publicly-available enrollment data from the California Department of 
Education that is aggregated at the school/grade level. Evaluators working with a school 
district could create the simulated district from actual student rosters. On the other end 
of the spectrum, researchers that are much more interested in exploring behavior than 
generating predictions about existing districts could create a simulated district by 
selecting district size and grade sizes from distributions. 
Creating the Simulated District in this Study Before any simulated stress can 
be placed on a district, I must create an object that represents the district in the computer. 
I used the publicly available data about grade-level enrollment at schools in California 
and school-level free/reduced lunch eligibility discussed above to construct a list wherein 
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each row represents a school. Each school in the simulated district contains the 
following: the school name, the district name, the enrollment in each grade from 
kindergarten through 12th grade, and the percentage of students eligible for free lunch. 
The raw data I obtained from the California Department of Education website has a row 
for each school/grade/race code that contains the enrollment for that group of students. I 
summed the enrollment in all the race codes for a grade in a school to determine the total 
enrollment in that grade in that school. I repeated that process for each grade in the 
school, and for each school in the district. With up to seven race codes and 13 grades, 
each row in the simulated district matrix that I create originally comes from up to 91 
rows in the raw data.
I created a second set of grade-level enrollment figures in each row that show 
how many students in each grade are eligible for free lunch. Because grade-level free 
lunch statistics are not publicly available, I assumed that the percentage of students in 
each grade that are eligible for free lunch is equal to the percentage of students in the 
school eligible for free lunch; i.e., the students eligible for free lunch in the school are 
proportionately distributed among the grades. 
The simulation executes two processes that are not based on actual data: 
assigning teachers to schools and counterfactually removing students as a part of the 
stress placed on the district. These processes are discussed in detail below, but the reader 
might find it helpful to know, from a data structure standpoint, that the number of 
teachers in the school before the stress, the counterfactual enrollments after the stress, 
and the number of teachers in the school after the stress are all added to each row in the 
simulated district matrix during the simulation.
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For the financial simulation, I will also need several economic estimates for each 
state or district modeled by the simulation. In some cases I will obtain a point estimate 
for the figure, in other cases I will obtain a data-based set of values that represents the 
actual distribution, and in the remaining cases I will estimate a distribution from which 
to choose values (Tengs, Osgood, and Chen, 2001). The parameters I will need are (a) 
per pupil expenditure, PPE (b) faculty salaries, (c) the faculty benefit (i.e., health 
insurance, retirement contribution, etc.) ratio, (d) the fixed cost of operating the school. 
See Table 3.7 for the role of these estimates in the the financial simulation (the faculty 
benefit ratio is, in fact, absent from Table 3.7, but it will modify the salary in the actual 
model).
Modeling the Componential Behavior
The componential behavior of the agents and the environment in the simulation 
will consist of decisions that the computer makes, either pseudo-randomly or based on 
rules applied to some input. Transition from one state to the next in the simulation could 
involve some or all of the following: (a) selecting a student for participation in the 
school choice program, (b) determining where the selected students goes after selection, 
(c) applying the impact that a student’s selection for participation has on other students 
in the district, (d) determining when to stop selecting students for participation, and (e) 
calculating the number of teachers each school requires.
The number and type of students participating in the school choice program—the 
shock to the system in the stress-test model—could be built to mimic existing school 
choice programs and proposals, or could span the range of parameters that a school 
choice program might take. The toy example described above shows one version of this 
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stress: The scenarios shown in Tables 5 and 6 depict school choice programs that draw 
the same number of students (25, or 1.6%) and in the same way (purely randomly). 
Other stress situations will involve a greater or lesser enrollment decline and/or will 
target some demographic groups and/or will allow the decision of a student to impact 
the likelihood that other students in his or her class will also participate in the school 
choice program, as described in Tengs, Osgood, and Chen (2001).
How faculty size is determined based on enrollment will pose a greater 
challenge. States and school districts sometimes post class size targets, but individual 
schools do not always adhere to these goals (J. Franks, personal communication, 27 July 
2012); sometimes principals allow class sizes to exceed the posted targets so that more 
students can attend their school. Because deciding on a number of teachers to employ is 
a rule—and not a value—using the technique of creating a distribution and selecting a 
number from that distribution (as used, for example, in Tengs, Osgood, and Chen, 2001) 
is not available in this case. Instead, I will develop a set of possible rules that will span 
the set of ways to select a number of teachers based on a number of students, and select 
a rule from this set. Allowing the hiring and firing rules to vary in different runs of the 
simulation will allow me to examine the impact of those rules on the outcome of the 
model, as in Nechyba (1999).
Iteration
With the initial state and componential behavior in place, I can conduct a single 
fundamental run of the simulation. Like other Monte Carlo simulations, this simulation 
will consist of iterating a simple step, recalculating the state of the system, and repeating 
either for some duration or until some terminating event occurs (Eckhardt, 1987). The 
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simple step that will be repeated is removing a single student from the matrix; 
recalculating the state of the system will involve recalculating the number of teachers in 
each school. This sequence of steps will continue until the desired number of students 
have been removed. To conclude a single fundamental run of the simulation, the 
percentage of teaching positions eliminated and the economic impact will be recorded in 
a data file.
For the second stage in the nested iterations I will repeat the process described 
above with identical initial states and componential rules many times. The percentage of 
teaching positions eliminated for all of these fundamental runs will be collected into a 
frequency distribution (as in Hertz, 1957). This frequency distribution will allow me to 
generate point estimates (e.g., the ratio of percentage of teaching positions eliminated to 
percent enrollment decline) but also to discuss descriptive statistics (e.g., standard 
deviation and skew). This same approach, but with financial information, will allow me 
to create and analyze a frequency distribution for economic impact as a proportion of 
per pupil expenditure.
The third stage in the nested iteration will involve varying the parameters used to 
create the initial state of the simulation (except for the district parameters) and the rules 
that govern agent behavior. The simulation will run the two lower iterations described 
above and generate point estimates, which will be stored in a data file along with the 
values for the parameters used in that run. I will conduct a sensitivity analysis using 
ANCOVA to determine how the parameters influence the faculty responsiveness and 
economic impact.
The fourth and final level of iteration will involve applying the process described 
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above to districts with different demographics. I will use 2-level hierarchical linear 
modeling (HLM) to assess the impact of demographic factors on the aggregate behavior 
described in the third level of iteration (Willms, 1999). The results of the HLM will 
allow me to answer the first and second research questions described above.
Conclusion
In this chapter I have presented a simplified model of the simulation to elucidate 
some important aspects of its function. I have also described the data I will use in this 
research, explained the componential rules that the simulation will use, and discussed 
the levels of iteration. 
The reader will notice that I have not offered an extremely thorough plan for 
how the simulation will come together. Gilbert & Terna (1999) argue that creating a 
simulation can teach us more about a system than the results of that simulation alone. 
For this reason, I feel it inappropriate to describe the fully formed simulation in the 
methods section of this work: what I have to say about the structure and features of this 
simulation is as much a result of this research as the statistics and graphs.
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CHAPTER 4: Results
Introduction and Structure
Simulation is both a tool and a process (Gilbert & Terna, 1999). I have decided to 
save the detailed descriptions of how the simulation was created until this results chapter 
because much of what we can learn about systems from simulation comes from what we 
will notice while creating them.
This chapter contains a description of the research done in this study. I will begin 
by describing the four levels of iteration in the simulation, and draw some conclusions 
when describing the fourth level of iteration. Finally, I will apply the simulation to a 
financial model of a school district and draw the remainder of conclusions presented in 
the work.
Levels of Iteration
Basic Step: Removing a Single Student
The fundamental operation in this model involves removing a single student from 
the simulated district. This action simulates a family deciding to have their student 
participate in the school choice program by enrolling in a charter school or a private 
school on a voucher (I will henceforth refer to charter schools and private schools as 
non-district schools to differentiate them from open-enrollment-like school choice 
programs). Because the simulated district only contains the public schools under the 
authority of the district, the students participating in the charter school or voucher-based 
school choice program are removed from the list of enrolled students, and not replaced. A 
more complete model of this system would then add that student to the list of students 
enrolled at the non-district school of the family’s choice. If the school choice program in 
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the simulation were an open enrollment model, the student would not be removed from 
the list of students enrolled in the district, rather the student’s designated school would be 
changed to a different school in the district. Most of the controversy surrounding school 
choice programs specifically involves voucher programs (Editorial Projects in Education 
Research Center, 2004). For this reason, I will focus primarily on sending students to 
non-district schools.
The process of selecting a student for participation begins by generating a pool of 
students from all schools in the district for a particular grade using school-level 
enrollment figures. Each student in the pool has a weight which represents the likelihood 
that the student will be selected compared to other students in that grade in the district. 
How these weights are determined (e.g., based on free/reduced lunch status or special 
education program) and used in the selecting of students is described in the Varying 
Policy Parameters section below. 
I use a two-step pseudo-random process for deciding which students to remove. 
First, the total weight is calculated for each school by summing the weights of all the 
students in that school. The first pseudo-random number then determines which school 
the student will come from. Once the school is chosen, a second pseudo-random number 
selects the student from that school based on the students’ weights. This process is 
mathematically equivalent to selecting a student from the pool of all students in that 
grade in the district—that is, a particular student is equally likely to be chosen for 
participation in either pseudo-random selection scheme—but the two-step process runs 
much faster on a computer: In the largest district in California, Los Angeles Unified, 
removing students is 40 times faster using the two-step process than by removing 
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students from the pool of all students.
Level 1: Removing Students from a District
The first level of iteration involves repeating the basic step until a pre-determined 
number of students have been removed, and the number of teachers in the district is 
determined both before and after the student removal process. The principal non-financial 
measurement in this analysis is the sensitivity of faculty size to enrollment, which I will 
refer to as the faculty/enrollment sensitivity, β; that is, the percent change in teachers pT 
per percent change in students pN, or
(4.1)
Some policies only impact some grades, though. In this analysis T is the number of 
teachers teaching grades affected by the school choice program, and N is the number of 
students in the grades affected by the school choice program. Decisions about how many 
students to remove and how to determine the number of teachers needed to teach the 
students in a district will be discussed in the Varying Policy Parameters section below.
Level 2: Monte Carlo Iteration of Level 1
The impact of removing a small fraction of the students in a district will depend 
on which particular students are removed in addition to depending on the policy 
parameters and district characteristics. Because of the pseudo-random nature of Level 1, 
two runs on the same district with the same policies could have different outcomes in 
terms of the faculty/enrollment sensitivity. Table 4.1 shows actual data from the 
Fallbrook Union Elementary school district in California from 2011, along with three 
runs of Level 1.
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Table 4.1 demonstrates that the size, or in some cases even existence, of faculty 
reductions depends on exactly which students decide to participate in the school choice 
program, even when the program parameters are the same. The faculty/enrollment 
sensitivities shown in this example suggest very different conclusions about the cost of 
the school choice program. Trial 1, with a sensitivity of 0.789, demonstrates that 
sometimes relatively little faculty reduction is possible, and the district will indeed lose 
funding, but not realize commensurate savings in faculty costs to offset them. In the case 
of Trial 1, money would need to be cut from elsewhere in the school’s budget, likely 
leading to a reduction in value to the students who do not participate in the school choice 
program; see the Monetary Accounting Model section below for a more complete 
discussion of the implications of faculty/enrollment sensitivity on budgets.
Trial 2 in Table 4.1, in contrast, shows a faculty/enrollment sensitivity of 1.578, 
meaning that if 5% of students left the district, 7.9% of the teachers could be let go. 
Depending on how much of the district’s spending is truly fixed, this outcome might free 
up more resources per student and be an overall financial victory for the district and a 
boon to its students.
Trial 3 falls in between: faculty size can decrease by 105% of the enrollment 
decline. This number is relatively close to a sensitivity of 1, and depending on how much 
of the district’s spending is fixed, might not lead to a significant decline or increase in 
resources per student who remain in the district.
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Table 4.1
An example of three runs of removing 5% of students from grades one through three in 
the Fallbrook Union Elementary school district
Trial School Grade 1 Grade 2 Grade 3 Teachers Sensitivity
San Onofre 106 102 99 12
Iowa Street 45 45 48 6
Frazier 97 95 87 10
Original Fallbrook 118 106 91 11
Live Oak 98 94 101 11
Pendleton 159 145 108 14
La Paloma 94 114 99 11
San Onofre 100 99 98 12
Iowa Street 43 43 45 6
Frazier 93 88 82 9
Trial 1 Fallbrook 113 100 86 11 0.789
Live Oak 92 87 97 10
Pendleton 150 140 101 14
La Paloma 90 108 92 10
San Onofre 102 95 92 10
Iowa Street 44 44 47 6
Frazier 92 88 84 9
Trial 2 Fallbrook 109 102 87 11 1.578
Live Oak 91 90 95 9
Pendleton 152 141 100 14
La Paloma 91 105 96 10
San Onofre 101 99 92 11
Iowa Street 42 44 46 6
Frazier 91 86 79 9
Trial 3 Fallbrook 114 100 87 11 1.052
Live Oak 92 90 98 10
Pendleton 151 142 103 14
La Paloma 90 104 96 10
Note. This table uses a district ceiling rule; see below for details about this rule. This high average sensitivity 
is not representative; see the A Variety of Districts section below.
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Figure 4.1. A histogram showing the frequencies of three faculty/enrollment sensitivity 
outcomes from removing 5% of first through third graders from the Fallbrook Union 
Elementary school district. This plot represents 10,000 trials of removing 5% of students 
and using a district ceiling rule to determine the number of teachers. The dotted vertical 
line (on the left side of the center bar) represents the mean faculty/enrollment sensitivity.
By running many trials, we can generate a list of faculty/enrollment sensitivities. 
We can then create a point estimate with an uncertainty estimate—for this district the 
point estimate, the mean faculty/enrollment sensitivity, is 1.279 and the uncertainty 
estimate, the standard deviation, is 0.219. On the other hand, Hertz (1957) would likely 
suggest that if we knew the relative frequencies of these outcomes we could make a 
better decision about the financial result of this school choice program than simply 
knowing a point value. Figure 4.1 shows the probability density of the outcomes of 
removing 5% of students in grades one through three from the Fallbrook Union 
Elementary school district. As seen in this plot, the cost saving 1.315 sensitivity outcome 
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is most likely by a good deal. The relatively expensive 0.789 sensitivity outcome is quite 
unlikely, and the potentially cost-neutral 1.052 sensitivity is slightly more common than 
the even greater cost saving 1.578 sensitivity outcome. As with any single piece of 
information, I would not recommend that this plot be used alone to make the decision 
about whether or not to implement this school choice program, but those making that 
decision would likely find this information helpful.
Level 3: Varying Policy Parameters
Teacher assignment rules. Thinning districts. Several aspects about the 
assignment of teachers can be varied in this analysis: the softness of the class size ceiling, 
the level of district coordination, and which teachers teach classes that are impacted by 
the school choice program. 
Most entities in a district are schools, but some are other educational programs. 
These other educational programs include support centers and alternative learning 
academies, which exist within another school. Others, like the Nonpublic, Nonsectarian 
designation, refer to students enrolled in a range of education programs outside the 
district, but paid for by the district (California Education Code, 2006). Because the 
students in these grades are unlikely to be taught as a group by a single teacher, it may be 
reasonable to remove these entities from the simulated district. Ignoring these education 
programs in the model, a process I will refer to as thinning, is accomplished by replacing 
all school/grade enrollment figures below a certain threshold, Nmin, with zero. Figure 4.2 
shows a kernel density plot of sensitivities determined using a soft district rule (see 
Ceiling Softness section below for a description of the rules that are used for determining 
the number of teachers in a district) for determining faculty size when the Pomona 
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Unified1 district is thinned and when it is not. We can conclude that thinning the district 
does not seem to have an significant effect on the mean faculty/enrollment sensitivity 
(t(1998) = 1.006, p = 0.315). The consistency of this insignificance is discussed in the A 
Variety of Districts section below. 
Figure 4.2. A frequency distribution of sensitivities in the Pomona Unified school district 
using a soft district ceiling before thinning the district of grades with less than 20 
students enrolled (Full, in the legend) and after thinning it (Thin, in the legend). The 
mean faculty/enrollment sensitivities are not significantly different.
Ceiling Softness. California law suggests three ways of using class size to 
determine the number of teachers required to teach a grade in a school in this simulation, 
1  I used the Pomona Unified school district instead of the Fallbrook Unified district because the Fallbrook 
Unified district had no grades in any schools with small enough enrollment to be removed in the thinning 
process.
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a hard ceiling, a soft ceiling at the district level, and a soft ceiling at the school level. The 
“hard ceiling” rule uses the stated district average class size targets shown in Table 4.2 as 
the absolute maximum class size for each classroom. The same rule is used when 
determining the number of teachers in a district both before and after the students are 
removed to participate in the school choice program.
Table 4.2
Class size targets for California public schools, grades K-8
Grade Range District Average Maximum Individual Classroom 
Maximum
Kindergarten 31 33
Grades 1 - 3 30 32
Grades 4 - 8 30 30
Note. Class size figures stated in sections 41376 and 41378 of the California Education Code (2006)
The “soft ceiling” rules suggested by California’s class size policy allows some 
classes to exceed the class size targets by a small number of students (in this case, two 
students per class in grades K-3) so long as the average class size for the district remains 
below the target. The following excerpt from Section 41367(a) of the California 
Education Code (2006) describes the method of calculating the excess number of 
students in a district:
For grades 1 to 3, inclusive, [the Superintendent of Public Instruction] shall 
determine the number of classes, the number of pupils enrolled in each class, the 
total enrollment in all such classes, the average number of pupils enrolled per 
class, and the total of the numbers of pupils which are in excess of thirty (30) in 
each class. 
For those districts which do not have any classes with an enrollment in 
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excess of 32 and whose average size for all the classes is 30.0 or less, there shall 
be no excess declared. For those districts which have one or more classes in 
excess of an enrollment of 32 or whose average size for all the classes is more 
than 30, the excess shall be the total of the number of pupils which are in excess 
of 30 in each class having an enrollment of more than 30.
Schools that exceed either the average class size of 30 or the individual class size 
of 32 will lose a portion of the funding normally allocated to those students, as stated in 
subsections (c)-(e) of Section 41367 of the California Education Code (2006). I will 
express the statements in these subsections with the following equation,
(4.2)
where ∆S is the number of students deducted from the district’s average daily attendance; 
a reduction in this number decreases the funding the district receives. Sx is the number of 
excess students in a district as calculated based on subsection 41367(a) above, SCA and SD 
are the enrollments in California and the district, respectively. Si and Si-1 are the 
enrollments for the current year and previous year, respectively.
The California education code does not prescribe that schools should have 
individual classes containing 31 or 32 students, rather it describes a penalty for exceeding 
this number. I have created these soft ceiling rules to simulate how a district could 
maximize its spending ability for a given number of students.
I refer to the maximum number of students that can enroll in a class beyond the 
stated classroom-level target as the “softness,” m, of the ceiling. We can interpret the soft 
ceiling in two ways. First, the soft ceiling can be applied using a hard ceiling at n + m 
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students plus enough teachers to push the average for the district below n students per 
class, and applying this rule both before and after the removal of students. This requires 
substantial coordination at the district level, so I will refer to it as the “district ceiling” 
rule. As with the hard ceiling rule, the district ceiling rule will be applied identically 
before and after the students are removed to participate in the school choice program; 
note that the hard ceiling rule is simply a soft ceiling rule where m = 0.
The second version of the soft ceiling rule, the “school ceiling” rule, does not 
require as much coordination at the district level. After the students decide to leave the 
district, schools might not, for whatever reason, make dramatic adjustments to the faculty 
unless enrollment falls to such a level that those adjustments could be made and still keep 
enrollment under the individual class size target, i.e., less than n students per class 
calculated at the school level. The number of teachers established before students are 
removed for the school choice program follows the same method as the district ceiling: 
the number of teachers is determined assuming a hard ceiling at n + m students per class 
with enough additional teachers to keep the average class size below n students per class 
within the school. After the students are removed, however, the number of teachers is 
determined using a hard ceiling at n students. If the hard ceiling at n students requires 
more teachers than initially placed in any individual school, the original, smaller number 
will be used. Table 4.3 summarizes these rules.
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Table 4.3
The rules used for deciding the number of teachers, T, in the simulation for a class size 
target of n and a softness parameter of m in a school with Ns students in the grade.
Rule Initial Determination Final Determination
Hard Ceiling
District Ceiling
School Ceiling
As asserted above, districts that operate in a fashion accurately modeled by the 
district ceiling rule would require more coordination than districts that operate according 
to the school ceiling rule. Suppose a small number of students leave a particular public 
school to participate in a non-district school choice program, and the decrease in 
enrollment would allow that school to reduce the number of teachers teaching second 
grade by one while keeping class sizes above n students, but below n + m students. The 
school could only enact this strategy if those making the decision could be certain that 
enough other classrooms in the district are sufficiently below the target class size to keep 
the district average class size below n students. If those making staffing decisions have 
no precise information about second grade class sizes in all schools in the district, the 
only way to certainly avoid the penalty associated with exceeding class sizes is to retain 
the full teaching faculty unless class sizes at that school would not exceed n students if a 
teaching position is eliminated. One can imagine that factors like the culture of 
intradistrict communication, reporting latency, building-level discretion, and the timing 
of contracts would all affect the level of coordination in a district; the specificity of these 
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factors fall outside the scope of this research, so I will treat the district ceiling rule and 
the school ceiling rule as bookends on the actual behavior of districts. 
The softness of the rule used to determine the number of teachers is an important 
determinant in the sensitivity of faculty size to a small reduction in enrollment. California 
law indicates we should expect that district officials used a softness of two (i.e., m = 2) 
when making staffing decisions for grades K-3. Logic would lead us to predict that softer 
ceilings would lead to a sensitivity nearer one using the district ceiling rule: large 
softness values would increase the likelihood that a district will be more constrained by 
the average class size of n students part of the rule than by the n + m rule for individual 
classrooms. In a district where the number of teachers is only determined based on the 
average class size, then it does not matter which students leave the district to participate 
in a school choice program—only the number of students will matter. Put another way, if 
only the average class size matters, then removing sR students from a district of s students 
means that tR = ⌊sR / n  ⌋ teaching positions can be eliminated, regardless of exactly which 
students leave.
On the other hand, we would predict that a softer ceiling will lead to a sensitivity 
nearer zero for a school ceiling. Larger softness values would mean that a school with 
high capacity utilization (i.e., a school with nearly n + m students in each classroom; see 
the A Variety of Districts section below for a thorough discussion of capacity utilization) 
with c classrooms would have to lose close to c × m students in order for class sizes in 
that school to fall to near n students, and then would have to lose n students beyond that 
before the faculty reductions would actually take place. Because many students would 
have to leave an efficiently utilized school before any changes in faculty size could take 
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place, the sensitivity of such a district would be small for large values of m.
The simulation generally supports the logic described above for the school ceiling 
rule. For the district ceiling rule, however, the sensitivity increases with softness up to the 
legally allowed value of m = 2; after that it declines contrary to the logic described above. 
Because the data analyzed here are based on actual districts that make decisions based on 
a class size of 30 and a softness of two, analyzing these data with different softnesses 
(i.e., softnesses different than those actually used by the districts) may not produce useful 
insights in any event. To the extent, however, that the grade sizes have a somewhat 
random component, the different softness levels may indicate some patterns that would 
arise if the softness rules were different. See the A Variety of Districts section below for a 
discussion of the consistency of these findings. Figure 4.3 shows box plots representing 
the range of sensitivities measured in the Fallbrook Union Elementary district when 5% 
of students have been removed and the faculty sizes are calculated based on the district 
ceiling rule and the school ceiling rule, respectively. Note again that a softnes of zero 
equates to a hard ceiling.
Because these two soft ceiling rules create such different behavior in the 
simulation, I will conduct all of the following analysis with both rules. Whenever the 
analysis calls for presenting the findings in graphical form I will show plots using both 
rules, with the plot created with district ceiling rule on top and the plot created with the 
school ceiling rule on the bottom.
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Figure 4.3. Box and whisker plots of the sensitivity of the Fallbrook Union Elementary 
school district with varying softnesses. The heavy line indicates the mean, the box 
encloses the interquartile range (IQR), and the dots represent observations beyond 1.5 
times the IQR from the mean. The top plot shows the district ceiling; the bottom plot 
shows the school ceiling. Note that the case where m = 0, which equates to a hard ceiling, 
is the same for both rules.
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School choice program parameters. Percent of students leaving the district. 
The central claim explored in this analysis is that faculty sizes cannot respond to small 
changes in enrollment, but what constitutes a “small” change in enrollment? We might 
guess that a district would have a better chance of eliminating teaching positions if 50% 
of students leave than if a single student—the smallest percentage of students possible—
leaves. We would face a difficult task, though, if we tried to logically estimate with 
precision how removal percentages between 50% and one student would behave. Figure 
4.4 shows the relationship between percentage of the student population removed and 
faculty/enrollment sensitivity. Surprisingly, though, for the district ceiling rule, some 
districts show a large faculty/enrollment sensitivity to very small removal percentages; 
this result is not indicative of a large pattern and will be further discussed in the A Variety 
of Districts section below.
Targeting student populations. Some school choice programs target students 
from certain demographic groups. The simulation can include this feature by giving 
students unequal probabilities of selection, or weights, when removing students for 
participation in the school choice program. Two methods of assigning these weights are 
compared in this analysis. The simplest method for removing students considers all 
students to be equally likely to participate in the school choice program—i.e., each 
student has a weight of 1. Some school choice programs are only available to low-income 
students; this can be represented in the simulation by giving students receiving free lunch 
a weight of 1 and all other students a weight of 0. The impact of only analyzing two 
methods of comparing weights is discussed in the Generality section of chapter five.
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Figure 4.4. Box and whisker plots of the sensitivity of the Fallbrook Union Elementary 
school district with varying percentages of student removed for participation in a school 
choice program. The upper plot was created using the district ceiling rule, and the lower 
plot was created using the school ceiling rule. In both cases students were removed from 
grades one through three.
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Free lunch students only. Insufficient accurate data exists in a publicly-available 
format at the grade level for the number of students eligible for free lunch programs to 
include free lunch eligibility as a parameter in the simulation with complete accuracy. 
Free lunch data only exists at the school level, so simulating a school choice program that 
only removes students from some grades requires the translation of school-level free 
lunch eligibility to grade-level free lunch eligibility. In this case I will assume that each 
grade in a school has the same percentage of students eligible for free lunch as the school 
as a whole.
As stated above, it is possible to program the simulation to only remove those 
students eligible for free lunch by setting the weight of those students not eligible for free 
lunch to zero. By setting weights in this way, once a school has been chosen in the two-
step pseudo-random selection process—the likelihood of which will be based only on the 
number of students eligible for free lunch—those students not eligible for free lunch have 
a 0% chance of being selected. If a school choice program intends to remove a 
percentage of students that would be larger than the number of students eligible for free 
lunch, the simulation will simply remove all of the eligible students. In this case the 
percentage of students removed to participate in the non-district school choice program 
would be smaller than that intended by the school choice program. Figure 4.5 shows the 
difference between a school choice program that removes 5% of all students using both a 
district ceiling and a school ceiling, and the identical programs that only selects students 
eligible for free lunch.
Figure 4.5 shows that the probability of outcomes indeed depends on the 
population selected for the school choice program (t(1982) = -5.244, p < .001 for the 
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district ceiling rule, and t(1793) = 28.745, p < .001 for the school ceiling rule). When the 
non-district school choice program only selects those students eligible for free lunch (the 
lighter lines in Figure 4.5), the lower-sensitivity outcomes occur less frequently under the 
school ceiling rule, but more frequently under the district ceiling rule. These results are 
not generalizable to other districts, especially in the case of the soft district rule; see A 
Variety of Districts for more discussion about these measurements. Even though the 
results from a particular district are not generalizable, I have included this detailed 
description in order to make the comparison of districts in the A Variety of Districts 
section more meaningful.
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Figure 4.5. Histograms showing the frequencies of faculty/enrollment sensitivities while 
removing 5% of grades one through three in the Fallbrook Union Elementary school 
district. The dashed lines show the mean for each group of faculty/enrollment 
sensitivities. The top plot shows the district ceiling rule and the bottom plot shows the 
school ceiling rule. The heaviness of the lines show the weight of the students that are 
ineligible for free lunch.
Table 4.4
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Enrollment and percent eligible for free lunch programs in the Fallbrook Union 
Elementary school district in grades one through three.
School Total Enrollmenta % Eligible for Free 
Lunchb
Free Lunch 
Enrollment
San Onofre 307 20% 60
Iowa Street 138 5% 7
Frazier 279 59% 165
Fallbrook 315 72% 227
Live Oak 293 59% 171
Pendleton 412 14% 56
La Paloma 307 64% 198
aThe total enrollment is for grades one through three only.
bThe percentage of students eligible for free lunch is school wide, and may not be completely accurate for this 
subset of grades.
Understanding why only selecting subpopulations changes the sensitivity of a 
district's faculty size to small changes in enrollment requires looking at how the 
subpopulation is distributed in the district. As shown in Table 4.4, Live Oak Elementary 
has a smaller total enrollment than Pendleton Elementary, and a greater number of 
students eligible for free lunch. Because all students eligible for free lunch are equally 
likely to be chosen for participation in the school choice program, Live Oak Elementary 
is over three times more likely to lose a student than Pendleton Elementary. This occurs 
because Pendleton Elementary has relatively few student eligible for free lunch, despite 
its higher enrollment. Concentrating the students removed for participation tends to 
increase the number of students removed in a subset of schools in the district, which 
increases the likelihood that one of those school will lose enough students to decrease its 
faculty size.
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Level 4: A Variety of Districts
All of the conclusions drawn above are based on individual districts in California, 
and should not be generalized beyond those particular districts. In this section, I will 
discuss how frequently the conclusions drawn thus far hold in the districts in California, 
and look for correlations between district characteristics and outcomes from this model.
I will look at five district characteristics in attempting to explain variation in 
sensitivity. First, I will look at district size, in terms of the number of schools. Second, I 
will look at the overall percentage of students eligible for free lunch. This characteristic 
will serve as a proxy for district affluence. 
Third, I will look at a more complicated characteristic described by Heinesen (2004): 
capacity utilization effects (p. 443), or CU. I will define the CU of a grade in a school as 
the size of the least-full class (assuming all other classes are completely full) compared to 
the target class size. In many cases the CU is given by,
(4.3)
This equation holds except in the case where all the classes are full; when all the classes 
are full, Ns mod n equals zero, but this situation represents perfect use of capacity, so the 
CU must be manually reset to one. For example, the second grade at Fallbrook Street 
Elementary in the Fallbrook Union Elementary district had 106 students in 2011. For the 
purpose of defining the CU of this district I will assume that this grade has three full 
classes of 32 (assuming a class size target of 30 and a softness of 2) and one partially full 
class of ten students. This grade then has a CU of 31% (10 / 32 = 0.31) using a soft 
ceiling. If we do not allow any softness in the ceiling, then the same grade has three 
A COMPUTER SIMULATION OF SCHOOL DISTRICT ECONOMICS 90
classes of 30 students and one class of 16 students, and a CU of 53%. The average CU of 
a district is calculated by summing the number of students in the partially full classes and 
dividing by the total capacity of those classes. 
Fourth, I will look at a related measure, the weighted capacity non-utilization 
(WCNU), which measures the relationship between the percentage of students eligible 
for free lunch in a particular school to that school’s CU. Finally, I will consider the 
minimum capacity utilization (MCU), which represents the lowest CU of all schools in 
the district.
For the purposes of this simulation, it does not matter if the second grade at 
Fallbrook Street Elementary actually has three classes of 32 and one class of ten, or two 
classes of 26 and two classes of 27. In either case the number of teachers required to staff 
the grade will reduce by one if ten students leave to participate in a non-district school 
choice program (assuming a district ceiling rule, or 16 students assuming a hard ceiling 
rule), but not if nine students leave. In terms of step costs as described previously, the CU 
measures the location of the grade on the step in terms of distance from the low end.
Capacity utilization differs importantly from mean class size in a district, 
although both measures show the relationship between actual class sizes and target class 
sizes. The 2011 class sizes for first grade and fifth grade at San Onofre Elementary in the 
Fallbrook Union Elementary district are 106 and 74 students, respectively. These grades 
have average class sizes of 26.5 students and 24.7 students, respectively, assuming a soft 
ceiling of 32. The first grade classrooms seem better occupied, which might matter in a 
strictly accounting-based discussion. In terms of allocation effects caused by school 
choice programs, though, we should view both grades as containing a few full classrooms 
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with 32 students (three in first grade and two in fifth) and one class each with ten 
students. So these two grades with different average class sizes have identical CUs. This 
matters because each grade would have to lose the same absolute number of students—
ten students in both cases—before a teaching position could be eliminated, even though 
ten students represents a different percentage of their enrollment.
Removing all students with equal probability. The following discussion will 
concern a non-district school choice program that removes 5% of students from grades 
one through three. We would not expect that either average free lunch eligibility or free 
lunch eligibility distribution would matter when free lunch eligibility plays no part in 
deciding which students to remove. Interestingly, though, the percentage of students 
eligible for free lunch does explain a significant part of the variation for both the district 
ceiling (F(1,536) = 4.838, p = 0.028) and the school ceiling (F(1,536) = 15.13, p < .001). 
In both cases the percentage of students eligible for free lunch is positively related to 
faculty/enrollment sensitivity, indicating that districts with lower average socioeconomic 
status can respond more sensitively than districts with higher average socioeconomic 
status. In neither case is the portion of the variation explained large, though (R2 = .007 
and R2 = 0.026, respectively). 
This result may seem surprising at first, but further examination offers both a 
statistical and contextual explanation for the existence of this relationship. Statistically, 
this relationship arises because of a weak, negative underlying relationship between 
percentage of students eligible for free lunch in a district and capacity utilization 
(F(1,536) = 4.526, p = 0.034); districts with a higher percentage of students eligible for 
free lunch tend to use their capacity less efficiently. Because of the relationship between 
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CU and faculty/enrollment sensitivity, the prediction that districts with lower 
socioeconomic status use their capacity less efficiently also leads to the prediction that 
those districts will have faculties that are more sensitive to losing a small number of 
students to a non-district school choice program. In fact, controlling for CU in the linear 
model before including percentage of students eligible for free lunch renders the 
relationship between faculty/enrollment sensitivity and the latter insignificant (F(2, 536) 
= 2.516, p = 0.113) when using the district ceiling rule. Percentage of students eligible 
for free lunch remains significant (F(2, 536) = 10.514, p = .001) even after controlling for 
CU using the school ceiling rule. Duncombe (2006) offers an explanation for why this 
situation might occur: more affluent districts also tend to have more involved voters, 
which produces a sort of “monitoring” (p. 19) effect that can pressure school boards and 
administrators to operate more efficiently. The observation here—that more affluent 
districts have higher CU and thus lower sensitivity—confirms this reasoning.
District size (as measured by the number of schools in the district) does not 
explain a significant portion of the variation in sensitivity (F(1, 536) = 0.003, p = 0.958 
and F(1, 536) = 3.611, p = 0.058 using a district and school ceiling rule, respectively). 
District size does, however, explain where the variation occurs. Figure 4.6 shows that 
districts with fewer schools have a much greater variation in sensitivity; large districts 
tend to have a sensitivity much closer to the overall mean than small districts. The lines 
of best fit in Figure 4.6 depict linear models of the absolute magnitudes of the 
observations (i.e., the positive size of the distance from the mean) as predicted by the 
number of districts. The negative slope of this line indicates that variation in sensitivity 
decreases as the number of schools in the district increases for both the district ceiling 
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rule (F(1,536) = 17.119, p < .001) and the school ceiling rule (F(1,536) = 4.680, p = .
031). The figures stated above use all observations. If the largest district in California, 
Los Angeles Unified, is removed, the model explains much more of the variation: from 
R2 = 0.029 to R2 = 0.100 for the district ceiling rule and R2 = 0.007 to R2 = 0.035 for the 
school ceiling rule. Los Angeles might reasonably count as an outlier, as the number of 
schools it contains, 916, lies more than 21 standard deviations above the mean for 
California as a whole.
Capacity utilization contributes most to our understanding of the variation in 
faculty/enrollment sensitivity across districts. We would expect that districts with a high 
CU would have lower faculty sensitivities to the removal of a small number of students: 
high CU indicates that a school is far from the low end of the step, and needs to lose a 
large fraction of the step size before faculty reductions are possible. If many schools in a 
district have this same quality, the removed students would not likely be concentrated 
enough to allow enrollment to cross to the next step down. Figure 4.7 shows that the 
simulation confirms this logic. CU explains a significant portion of the variation in 
sensitivity in simulations that use both the district ceiling rule (F(1,536) = 65.98, R2 = 
0.108, p < .001) and the school ceiling rule (F(1,536) = 204.8, R2 = 0.275, p < .001). 
Additionally, the coefficients in each case are negative, indicating that districts with a 
higher CU tend to respond to the removal of students less sensitively.
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Figure 4.6. The relationship between number of schools in a district and sensitivity for 
both a district ceiling rule (top) and a school ceiling rule (bottom) when 5% of students 
leave from grades one through three. The linear model shows positive distance from the 
mean modeled by number of districts. To increase readability, the scales of these plots are 
reduced to omit the two largest districts in California, though they were present for the 
calculations.
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Free lunch students only. Like the simulation that removes all students with equal 
probability, the faculty/enrollment sensitivity of a simulation that only removes students 
eligible for free lunch depends heavily on capacity utilization in the district. It also 
depends on how the students eligible for free lunch are distributed, particularly, whether 
the students eligible for free lunch are concentrated in schools with low CU. To explore 
this relationship, I will create a measure of capacity non-utilization (i.e., the distance 
from the high end of the step instead of the low end) that is weighted by the proportion of 
students eligible for free lunch in the district that can be found in that grade, or WCNU.
(4.4)
When choosing only students eligible for free lunch, a school is most likely to 
eliminate a teaching position when the CU is low (i.e., it is close to the low end of the 
step) and when the school has a large fraction of the students eligible for free lunch, as 
this increases the expected number of students who will leave that school. I use the 
distance from the high end of the step, 1 - CU, so that both terms that are multiplied 
together will have larger values when the probability of eliminating a teaching position is 
high. Figure 4.8 shows plots of the mean faculty/enrollment sensitivity modeled by 
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Figure 4.7. Faculty/enrollment sensitivity to removing 5% of students in grades one 
through three modeled by CU in school districts in California using a district ceiling rule 
(top) and a school ceiling rule (bottom). The large dot represents the Fallbrook Union 
Elementary school district.
WCNU from 500 runs of the simulation using a district ceiling, removing 5% of 
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students from grades one through three, and choosing only students eligible for free 
lunch. Table 4.5 describes the relationships between WCNU and faculty/enrollment 
sensitivity.
Table 4.5
A summary of linear models that describe the relationships between faculty/enrollment 
sensitivity and weighted capacity non-utilization.
Rule Included Data F R2 p
District ceiling All data 55.62 0.108 < .001
District ceiling Significant data 184.6 0.441 < .001
School ceiling All data 25.11 0.051 < .001
School ceiling Significant data 54.37 0.203 < .001
One of the two trend lines on Figure 4.8 depicts linear models for all of the data; 
the other trend line shows a model that only includes those observations for which the 
mean sensitivity calculated when selecting only students eligible for free lunch differs 
from the mean sensitivity found when selecting all students with equal probability; 
significance is defined at an α = 0.05 level using the Bonferroni-Holm correction for 
multiple comparisons. 
The model that uses all data would be most helpful for policy makers interested in 
predicting the economic impact of a proposed school choice program, because the model 
does not rely on our ability to predict which districts will have a significant difference in 
mean sensitivity between school choice programs that target all students or only those 
eligible for free lunch. Even though this finding may have little direct application in 
policy discussions, it does contribute significantly to our understanding of how removing 
a small number of students affects the number of teaching positions in a district: When 
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Figure 4.8. Faculty/enrollment sensitivity to removing 5% of students, targeted at 
students eligible for free lunch in grades one through three modeled by WCNU in school 
districts in California using a district ceiling rule (top) and a school ceiling rule (bottom).
targeting students eligible for free lunch matters, the degree of concentration of students 
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eligible for free lunch in low-CU schools affects the faculty/enrollment sensitivity a great 
deal.
Different “small numbers” of students. Figure 4.9 shows that the percentage of 
students removed from the Fallbrook Union Elementary district significantly impacts the 
sensitivity of the faculty size to changes in enrollment. In the case of the Fallbrook Union 
Elementary district, the smallest percentages (i.e., those percentages below 3%) resulted 
in sensitivities near zero using the school ceiling rule and above one using the district 
ceiling rule. As the percentage of students removed increased, the sensitivity increased 
sharply using the school ceiling rule and decreased somewhat, though significantly, using 
the district ceiling rule. As we have seen in this section, though, districts can behave very 
differently in the simulation, and that finding holds for the percentage of students 
removed as well. 
To examine the consistency of the influence of percentage of students removed in 
the simulation on sensitivity I created a simulation to run 50 trials of removing a 
percentage of students and determining faculty size using both the district and school 
ceiling rules. The percentages of students removed were integer percents between 1% 
and 15%, inclusive. This simulation then ran over all districts in California with more 
than one elementary school. For each district, I recorded the slope and intercept of the 
line of best fit. Figure 4.9 shows a pseudo-random selection of 30 of these districts. 
Plotting all 537 lines makes the figure very hard to read, but the selection of lines shown 
in Figure 4.9 is representative of the group of lines as a whole; the slopes of the lines in 
the selection do not meaningfully differ from the slopes of the whole group (t(31.69) = 
0.564, p = 0.577, and t(34.08) = -0.302, p = 0.765 for district and school ceiling rules, 
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respectively). Figure 4.9 shows that the impact of percentage of students removed on 
faculty/enrollment sensitivity is more consistent for the school ceiling rule than for the 
district ceiling rule. The collection of slopes for the school ceiling rule is significantly 
different from being randomly distributed around zero (t(536) = 10.83, p < .001); the 
95% confidence interval [2.579, 3.722] shows that the trend in the slopes is to be 
significantly larger than zero. This indicates that as the percentage of students removed as 
part of a school choice program decreases, so does the sensitivity of faculty size.
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Figure 4.9. Lines of best fit based on simulations that remove between 1% and 15% of 
students from 30 districts in California. The top plot was created using the district ceiling 
rule, and the bottom plot was created using the school ceiling rule. For reference, the 
heavier line is based on the Fallbrook Union Elementary district. The dashed lines 
represent lines of best fit that are not significant at an α = 0.05 level.
The slopes found using the district ceiling rule, on the other hand, tell a different 
story. The 95% confidence interval of slopes [-0.840, 0.437] does contain zero, indicating 
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that we cannot state that the impact of removing different percentages of students is 
different than zero (t(534) = -0.621, p = 0.536). This does not occur, however, because 
percentage of students removed tends not to influence the sensitivity in different districts, 
but because the magnitude (i.e., steepness) and direction (i.e., positive or negative) of the 
influences occur with fairly uniform frequency. Even more importantly, a strong, 
negative relationship (R2 = 0.895, F(1,533) = 4542, p < 0.001) exists between the slope 
and the intercept of the lines of best fit generated using the district ceiling rule. This 
indicates that the variation in slope is not due to a variation in the faculty/enrollment 
sensitivities at high percentages of students removed, but to a variation in sensitivities at 
very low percentages of students removed. That is, districts with a negative relationship 
between percentage of students removed and faculty/enrollment sensitivity tend to have 
that relationship because they have a high faculty/enrollment sensitivity at very low 
percentages of students removed, and not because they have a particularly high 
sensitivity at large percentages of students removed. In short, without knowing anything 
about a district, we can state that if the way of deciding on faculty size is best modeled by 
the school ceiling rule, then sensitivity will decrease as percentage of students removed 
decreases. If faculty size is best modeled by the district ceiling rule, then sensitivity will 
become more dramatic and less predictable as the percentage of students removed 
decreases.
We can use hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) to relate district parameters to the 
magnitude and direction of the relationship between percentage of students removed and 
faculty size sensitivity. Two district characteristics account for a significant part of the 
variation in slopes of the lines of best fit created by simulating different percentages of 
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students removed in California school districts. Not surprisingly, CU is one and a related 
measure, minimum capacity utilization (MCU) is the other. Where CU represents the 
average capacity utilization of all schools in a district, MCU represents the lowest 
capacity utilization of all schools in a district. For example, if the third grade in a ten-
school district has nine schools where the smallest classes each contain 29 students (with 
a maximum class size of 30) and one school where the smallest class contains 2 students, 
the CU for that grade would be 0.877, but the MCU would be 0.067. As it turns out, 
when removing a very small number of students, the MCU can be more important than 
the CU. Table 4.6 shows an ANOVA of the slopes of lines of best fit created by 
simulating the removal of varying percentages of students. Note that of the 537 districts 
with multiple elementary schools, the linear models discussed here only use the 458 
districts that do not have to add extra teachers after initially placing teachers using the 
district or ceiling rule—recall that those two rules are identical before students are 
removed by the simulation. In 79 of the districts, the average class size in at least one 
grade would be greater than the target district class size, 30 in this case. I excluded these 
districts because they behave similar to a hard ceiling at 30 students per class instead of a 
soft ceiling at 32 students; in a real and meaningful sense, these districts are different 
than the other 458 and should not be included when attempting to discern the behavior of 
a school district during a school choice program.
Table 4.6
ANOVA of the slopes of lines of best fit created by removing between 1% and 15% of 
students from each district in California using both the school ceiling rule and the 
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district ceiling rule.
Rule Parameter Coefficient p R2
District Ceiling 0.152
Intercept 5.887 < .001
CU -13.30 < .001
MCU 20.49 < .001
School Ceiling 0.655
Intercept 14.78 < .001
CU -18.93 < .001
MCU -4.846 < .001
aThe word “intercept” here refers to the expected value of the slope when CU = 0 and MCU = 0, and not, for 
example, the location of where the lines of best fit on Figure 4.9 cross the y-axis.
Note. These linear models were created using only districts that do not have to consider the district average 
class size when placing teachers.
The direction (i.e., positive or negative) of the coefficients suggest interesting 
behavior for the district and school ceiling rules. For the district ceiling rule, both the 
expected slope2 when CU = 0 and MCU = 0 and the coefficient for MCU are positive, 
while the coefficient for CU is negative. When the least efficiently utilized school in a 
district is particularly poorly utilized (i.e., a small MCU), the slope will tend to be 
smaller. This makes sense because of the strong, negative relationship between slope and 
intercept for the lines of best fit found using the soft district rule: a smaller MCU means a 
smaller slope, which means a larger intercept, and thus a greater sensitivity to very small 
enrollment changes. In other words, districts that contain a poorly utilized school can be 
overly sensitive to very small enrollment changes.
To understand the HLM coefficients for the school ceiling rule, we have to look at 
the other end of the range of percentages. When using the very smallest percentages of 
2  The “expected slope” is called the “intercept” in Table 4.6, but I will avoid that term here because I use 
“intercept” in a different capacity in this section, as well.
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students removed, the sensitivities calculated using the school ceiling rule are typically 
zero with a few outliers at the next smallest value that represents decreasing the faculty 
size by one teacher. Because a sensitivity of zero is the absolute minimum sensitivity in 
this simulation—which is to say that a district will never hire teachers after losing 
students to a non-district school choice program—variation in slope occurs because of 
differences in sensitivity at the high-percentage end of the range. The expected slope 
when CU = 0 and MCU = 0 for the school ceiling rule is positive, and the coefficients for 
CU and MCU are both negative. Because of the absolute minimum sensitivity of zero at 
the low percentages, we can interpret the negative coefficients for the slopes as meaning 
that high-CU and high-MCU districts have smaller sensitivities for larger percentages of 
students removed, which confirms the logic described elsewhere in this study.
Monetary Accounting Model
Faculty/enrollment sensitivity, although interesting, serves as an intermediate 
measure between the behavior of the schools during a non-district school choice program 
and what advocates and decision makers actually disagree about: money3. The simulation 
described above can model district finances by viewing students as the source of district 
funding and teachers as comprising one of four categories in a district’s budget. As a way 
of exploring the role of allocation effects on district finances, I will create a financial 
model of a district by assuming that students are the only source of funding and teachers 
represent one of the district’s significant expenditures. This monetary accounting model 
differs from a cost accounting model (Levin & McEwan, 2001) in that the monetary 
accounting model described here aims to show the budget of the school district, and not a 
3  All of the monetary amounts in this section are expressed in 2011 dollars.
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larger gamut of monetary and non-monetary costs. The cost and funding categories that I 
will work with are shown in Table 4.7.
Table 4.7
Funding and expenditure in the financial model of the district.
Category Funding/Expenditure Behavior
Funding
     Per pupil expenditure $9,139 Proportional to enrollment
Expenditure
     Plant and administration p% of budget Fixed
     Instructional facultya $63,903 per teacher Proportional to faculty size
     Other faculty Varies Inversely related to faculty 
size
     Non-instructional 
services
Varies Inversely related to other 
spending
aThis is the mean faculty salary in California from 2011. In some trials of the simulation described below, 
this average salary was used to generate salaries for individual teachers. The particulars of creating faculty 
salaries for use in this simulation is described below.
The financial model employed in this inquiry assumes that all of the money that 
provides for a district’s spending is determined by the number of students that attend 
school in that district. Each student enrolled brings the district the same amount of 
money, which I refer to as the per pupil expenditure (PPE). The funding that comprises 
the PPE might come from various sources, like the city, state, or federal government, 
local levies, district power equalization or block grants, etc. The nature of funding 
sources may, in fact, play an important role—as shown by Nechyba (1999)—but that 
behavior falls outside the scope of this study. I will consider the funding for education in 
California as a constant dollar amount allocated per pupil. In 2011, the PPE in California 
was $9,139; this differs from the per pupil revenue, which was $11,048 (Holeywell, 
2013). Spending differs from revenue in that revenue includes factors such as “capital 
A COMPUTER SIMULATION OF SCHOOL DISTRICT ECONOMICS 107
outlays and other costs” (Holeywell, 2013, p. 1). Spending only includes those budgetary 
components that go directly to the educational service of the students. The decision to use 
spending versus revenue will not impact the absolute financial calculation of the impact 
of a school choice program, because the $1,909 per pupil counted as revenue but not 
included as spending would count as part of the fixed cost in this monetary accounting 
model, but it will matter when the financial calculation is expressed as a portion of the 
PPE. Using spending to determine the size of the budget will show the higher allocation 
cost (or benefit) of a school choice program as a portion of PPE: if the simulation finds 
that each participant creates an allocation cost of $200, that allocation cost will be a 
larger percent of the spending (2.2% of $9,139) than the revenue (1.8% of $11,048). I 
will use spending as the measure of the size of a district’s budget because using spending 
makes the percentage of the district budget allocated for faculty salaries closer to the 
stated average of approximately 60% (Holeywell, 2013)—the portion of the district 
budget dedicated to instructional costs calculated here is approximately 32% when using 
spending, and approximately 26% when using revenue. A possible explanation for the 
difference in average reported faculty expenditure and the faculty expenditure calculated 
here is discussed below.
Most voices on both sides of the school choice debate agree that the operation of a 
school includes some fixed costs, or at least costs with a sufficiently large step size to 
behave as though they are fixed for the purpose of this simulation. Costs that fit into this 
category include building maintenance, some utilities, and some personnel costs. Small 
changes in enrollment would not allow a district to close and sell entire schools, so this 
category of costs will not change under any circumstances that will arise here. The size of 
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a district’s fixed costs will vary, so, instead of trying to determine an appropriate 
percentage of the budget dedicated to fixed costs that will apply to all districts, I will 
select the portion of a district’s budget that is fixed from the range [10%, 80%] of non-
faculty spending; see below for a discussion of how the size of fixed costs affects the 
financial outcomes of this simulation. In practice this works out to between 4% and 32% 
of the district’s total budget.
The most important cost category in this study is instructional faculty salaries. I 
will determine the cost of a teaching faculty in a district in two ways. First, using the 
average salary—$63,903 in California in 2011—and multiplying by the number of 
teachers in the district and a benefit ratio. The benefit ratio (always assumed to be 1.25 in 
this simulation) accounts for the non-salary aspects of teacher compensation, such as 
retirement contribution and health benefits. The second method involves using the 
starting and maximum salary in California in 2011—$41,372 and $81,573, respectively
— to create a hypothetical list of salaries for individual teachers. To do this I will center a 
normal distribution between the ends of the salary scale, at $61,472, and the set the 
standard deviation at one fourth of the range, or $10,050, and then pseudo-randomly 
generate a list of salaries from this distribution. If any salaries generated in this way fall 
below the minimum or above the maximum, the algorithm will reset them to the nearest 
boundary. This method allows for the determination of the change in total faculty cost if 
the teachers cut from the district are chosen by seniority (i.e., removing the newest 
teachers with the lowest salaries) or by retirement (by letting the most experienced 
teachers with the highest salaries retire). Note that the center of the range of salaries lies 
below the average salary in California. To account for this, I will multiply the cost of 
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faculty by a constant determined before students are counterfactually removed from the 
district and the size of the faculty changes. After the students are removed, I will multiply 
the calculated faculty cost by this same constant. See Table 4.8 for an equation that 
describes these methods. The fact that the center of the salary range and the mean faculty 
salary differ indicates that the distribution of salaries is not normal. Assuming a normal 
distribution, while likely inaccurate, does still allow this simulation to select teachers 
from the high and low end of the salary range, and so still accomplishes the goal of 
creating the distribution.
Table 4.8
Equations that show how faculty cost is determined from aggregate salary information 
and the number of teachers.
Rule Equation
Mean salary rule  
Salary distribution 
rule
Note. Cfaculty is the cost of the district’s faculty, Ŝ is the mean faculty salary, T is the number of teachers in a 
district, rbenefit is the benefit ratio, U(m,sd) is an element chosen from the uniform distribution centered at m 
with a standard deviation of sd, Smin and Smax are the starting and maximum salaries, respectively.
The other faculty category of costs is added to make the faculty spending 
calculated in this model equal to 60%, the stated average percentage of a district’s budget 
that goes to faculty spending (Holeywell,). The reasons that the calculated faculty 
spending in this model do not sum to 60% of the calculated budget are numerous, but 
special education likely accounts for a substantial portion. Special education classes are 
often smaller than other classes in a school, and some students receiving special 
education services attend mainstream classes but have a paraprofessional to help ensure 
they receive an appropriate educational experience. Neither of these factors are 
A COMPUTER SIMULATION OF SCHOOL DISTRICT ECONOMICS 110
accounted for in this model, and both would make actual faculty spending higher than 
predicted by this model. Accounting for the role of special education in the selection of 
students and in creating the financial model of the districts will be an important area of 
future research. 
I calculate the cost of the other faculty before removing students for the non-
district school choice program, and then leave that cost when determining the financial 
model afterward. Because this faculty spending is not suggested by the enrollment in the 
district, I assume that changes in enrollment will not affect this category of the budget.
The final line in the model of a district’s budget described here is non-
instructional services. I assume that all of a district’s money not spent on fixed operating 
costs or faculty goes to offer students a rich education experience; this represents the full 
amount of money available to provide services to students. These services take myriad 
forms: art supplies and musical instruments, equipment for athletics, busing and 
admission for field trips, just to name a few. Dividing this amount of money by the 
number of students in the district yields the average amount of money spent on each 
student, or Services Per Student (SPS). The interplay among enrollment, faculty size, and 
the percentage of the budget dedicated to fixed costs will likely change the SPS in a 
district as a result of a non-district school choice program.
The ultimate financial measure that I will calculate is the allocation cost per 
participant, ACP. The ACP is the reduction in SPS summed over the students who remain 
in the district during the non-district school choice program, divided among the students 
who participate in the non-district school choice program, then expressed as a portion of 
the loss in spending of the students who participate, or 
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(4.5)
where SPSi and SPSf are the calculated SPS values before and after removing students 
from the district, respectively; and Si and Sf are the numbers of students in the district 
before and after removing students from the district, respectively. For example, an ACP 
of 0.4 indicates that 40% of the PPE for each student that participates in the program 
should be counted as a cost to the students who remain in the district.
I chose the ACP as the ultimate financial measure in this study for two reasons. 
First, this number will help policy makers arrive at a monetary value to include in a cost-
effectiveness study, and additionally, inflation will not affect this number. Assuming that 
the relationship between average faculty salary and per pupil expenditure remains 
roughly similar over time, the ACP predicted for a given school choice program in a 
given district should not change. Second, some school choice advocates recommend 
creating vouchers for less than the per pupil expenditure as a way of allowing public 
schools to continue to cover their costs, thus making voucher programs more palatable. 
Calculating the ACP allows policy makers to better understand how much of a voucher 
could be offered while not harming a public schools ability to cover its fixed (and 
potentially step) costs. Policy recommendations of this sort are discussed in more detail 
in chapter five.
The influence of the percentage of students removed for participation. The results 
described in the A Variety of Districts section above show that the percentage of students 
removed from a district for participation in a school choice program strongly affects the 
faculty/enrollment sensitivity. Using a school ceiling rule, the faculty/enrollment 
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sensitivity remains at zero up to approximately 4% of students removed and then 
increases. Using the district ceiling rule, the faculty/enrollment sensitivity varies 
enormously for removal percentages near zero, and then converges to the mean as the 
removal percentage increases. Because we expect a relationship between 
faculty/enrollment sensitivity and allocation cost, running the accounting model with 
various percentages of students removed should show that the cost depends on the 
number of students removed. But because the number of students removed will also 
affect the magnitude of the change in the amount of money available for non-
instructional services compared to fixed costs, predicting the relationship between 
percentage of students removed and allocation cost using logic alone will be challenging, 
if not impossible. 
To explore this relationship, I ran the simulation three times with 100 trials each 
on every district in California with students in grades one through three; the percentage 
of students removed in each of the three runs were 2%, 5%, and 8% of students. Figure 
4.10 shows kernel density plots for each removal percentage using both the school 
ceiling rule and the district ceiling rule. The percentage of the budget dedicated to fixed 
costs in both cases is 25% and the faculty spending was calculated in all trials using the 
mean teacher salary. Table 4.9 shows a summary of these trials.
Because of the large number of observations—100 trials for each of the 536 
districts with more than one elementary school—the difference in ACP values based on 
percentage of students removed is significant (F(1,160498) = 121.9, p < .001, and 
F(1,160498) = 813.4, p < .001, for the district and school ceiling respectively), but in 
neither case is the impact of percentage of students removed very important (R2 < .001, 
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and R2 = .005, respectively). We can conclude that other factors have more influence on 
ACP than percentage of students removed. A relationship exists, statistically speaking, 
but policy makers can safely ignore that relationship when considering parameters of a 
school choice program.
Table 4.9
Calculated ACP for all districts in California using the average teacher salary and 
assuming that 25% of a district’s budget goes to fixed costs.
Teacher assignment 
rule
% students removed Mean ACP % less than zero
2% 0.555 8.79%
District Ceiling 5% 0.571 1.76%
8% 0.573 0.51%
2% 0.767 4.88%
School Ceiling 5% 0.775 0.56%
8% 0.730 0.06%
The influence of the size of fixed costs. Figure 4.11 shows box and whisker plots 
for the ACP calculated during 100 trials of all districts in California with elementary 
schools. As stated above, the fixed costs used in these calculation range from 10% of 
non-instructional spending (4% of the total budget) to 80% of non-instructional spending 
(32% of the total budget). All trials in this section use the mean teacher salary when 
calculating faculty spending. This analysis shows that decision makers should predict a 
higher ACP when the portion of the district’s budget that is fixed is large. This behavior
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Figure 4.10. Kernel density plots showing the frequency of allocation effect per 
participant values in all districts in California for three different percentages of students 
removed for participation in school choice programs. The top plot uses the district ceiling 
rule, the bottom plot uses the school ceiling rule, and both plots assume that 25% of a 
district’s budget goes to fixed costs.
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occurs because the size of the fixed portion of the budget is inversely related to the level 
of resources available to provide non-instructional services to students. When removing 
the same absolute amount from two unequally size pools, the relative amount removed 
from the smaller pool will be larger.
Table 4.10
Calculated ACP for grades one through three in districts in California using the average 
teacher salary and assuming that different amounts of a district’s budget goes to fixed 
costs.
Teacher assignment 
rule
Fixed % of budget Mean ACPa % less than zero
4% 0.361 5.19%
11% 0.431 3.31%
District Ceiling 18% 0.501 2.28%
25% 0.571 1.76%
32% 0.641 1.19%
4% 0.565 1.56%
11% 0.635 1.00%
School Ceiling 18% 0.705 0.57%
25% 0.775 0.56%
32% 0.845 0.19%
aBecause of the large number of observations—100 trials for each of the 537 districts with more than one 
elementary school—the difference in ACP values based on percentage of the budget counted as fixed is 
significant (F(1,267498) = 97550, p < .001, and F(1,267498) = 57380, p < .001, for the district and school 
ceiling respectively). Unlike percentage of students removed, the percentage of the budget assumed to be 
fixed is important (R2 = 0.267, and R2 = 0.177, respectively).
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Figure 4.11. Box and whisker plots showing the frequency of ACP values in all districts 
in California for five assumptions about the portion of a district’s budget that is fixed. 
The top plot uses the district ceiling rule, the bottom plot uses the school ceiling rule, and 
both plots remove 5% of students for participation in the school choice program.
The influence of different methods of selecting teaching positions for removal. 
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Just as exactly which students participate in a school choice program can affect the size 
of allocation effects created by non-district school choice programs, which teachers leave 
the district when faculty positions are eliminated will affect district finances as well. This 
occurs because teachers at the high end of the pay scale earn more than twice as much as 
teachers at the low end of the pay scale. A district that shrinks its faculty size by not 
filling a position after the retirement of an experienced, highly educated teacher would, 
we assume, reduce its faculty spending by $101,966 (the maximum salary of $81,573 
times the benefit ratio of 1.25). On the other hand, a district that lets a new teacher at the 
bottom of the pay scale go, say, because of seniority, would only reduce faculty spending 
by $51,751. The district that reduced its faculty size by retirement would then have 
$50,251 more to spend on enriching the educational experience of students in that district 
compared to the district that eliminated a faculty position based on seniority. This 
additional $50,251 would reduce that allocation cost (or increase the allocation benefit) 
of the school choice program.
I will compare three different methods for deciding on the specific teachers to 
remove when the faculty size required in a district decreases. First, I will assume that 
every teacher earns the 2011 average salary of $63,903. Second, I will assume that the 
elimination of every teaching position can occur by not filling a position after the 
retirement of an experienced, highly-educated teacher at the top of the pay scale. To 
eliminate n teaching positions in a district in this way, I will create a distribution of 
faculty salaries as described above and eliminate the n greatest salaries. Finally, I will 
assume that all faculty reductions occur by laying off new, low-paid teachers. Like 
reduction by retirement, I will create a distribution as described above and eliminate the 
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n lowest salaries. Because the seniority- and retirement-based methods both involve the 
generation of lists of salaries from a random distribution, I will conduct these 
calculations for the Fallbrook Union Elementary school district many times using a 
Monte Carlo simulation; all trials in this simulation assume that the fixed cost is 25% of 
the total budget and remove 5% of students for participation in the school choice 
program.
Figure 4.12 shows kernel density plots for 50,000 trials in the Fallbrook Union 
Elementary school district that remove 5% of students and assume that 25% of a district’s 
budget is fixed. Each distribution in Figure 4.12 shows the distribution of costs using one 
of the methods for deciding which teachers would no longer work in the district 
described above. 
The bottom plot in Figure 4.12 shows the distributions found using the school 
ceiling rule. Note that each distribution has an identically-located local maximum at the 
low end of the spectrum, near an ACP of 0.85. It may at first be surprising that this local 
maximum should occur at the same ACP value for all three distributions. The reason for 
this identically-located maximum is that the trials that result in an ACP of 0.85 are the 
trials where the faculty size cannot decrease—i.e., a faculty/enrollment sensitivity of 
zero. If no faculty positions can be eliminated, then it does not matter how the salary of a 
teacher is determined.
Figure 4.12 shows that the ACP experienced in a district indeed depends on the 
salary of the teachers that leave the payroll when the faculty size shrinks. If faculty 
reductions occur when more expensive teachers earning near the top of the pay scale 
retire and those positions are left vacant, the ACP is smaller. Conversely, if new, low-
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earning teachers are laid off to satisfy faculty reduction, the ACP will be larger. 
Furthermore, the influence of the rule used to calculate faculty cost savings becomes 
more pronounced as the number of teaching positions removed increases. The mean 
number of teaching positions eliminated in these trials using the district ceiling rule is 
4.87, and 0.41 using the school ceiling rule and district ceiling rule, respectively. Which 
rule was used to calculate faculty cost savings explains more of the variation in the 
former (R2 = 0.644, p < .001) than the latter (R2 = 0.031, p < .001). Table 4.11 further 
summarizes these results.
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Figure 4.12. Kernel density plots showing the distribution of allocation effect per 
participant using different methods of determining faculty salary. Each plot was made by 
simulating the Fallbrook Union Elementary school district assuming that 25% of the 
district’s budget is fixed and 5% of students are removed from grades one through three. 
The top plot used the district ceiling rule and the bottom plot uses the school ceiling rule.
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Table 4.11
Calculated ACP using different methods of determining faculty salary for the Fallbrook 
Union Elementary school district removing 5% of students in grades one through three 
and assuming that 25% of a district’s budget goes to fixed costs.
Teacher assignment 
rule
Faculty salary rule Mean ACPa % less than zero
By seniority 0.559 0
District Ceiling By mean salary 0.442 0
By retirement 0.323 < .001
By seniority 0.827 0
School Ceiling By mean salary 0.815 0
By retirement 0.805 0
aThe difference in ACP values based on the rule used to calculate faculty cost savings is significant 
(F(1,149997) = 135900, p < .001, and F(1,14997) = 2407, p < .001, for the district and school ceiling 
respectively).
Conclusion
The simulation of a district as a financial system described here allows us to 
explore and understand aggregate behavior of school districts based on componential 
rules. Some of the findings presented here conform to our expectations, while others may 
surprise us. As a conclusion to this chapter, I will summarize the important behaviors of 
districts as financial systems that we can take away from this study.
The degree of intradistrict coordination matters.
Better coordinated districts can respond to small enrollment changes more 
sensitively than uncoordinated districts. I have considered a district well-coordinated 
when the schools in that district can communicate their class sizes with sufficient 
timeliness and accuracy to allow some classes to exceed the average class size target 
based on the knowledge that other classes are small enough to keep the district average 
below the target. The magnitude of this difference depends heavily on other parameters 
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in the simulation, but we can conclude that better-coordinated districts have higher 
faculty/enrollment sensitivities and lower ACP values than other districts.
The degree of capacity utilization matters greatly.
Heinesen (2004) found that education systems operating near capacity are less 
sensitive to small enrollment declines, and the present study confirms this finding. This 
finding also supports the view that faculty costs behave like step costs in a district: more 
efficiently utilized schools are less sensitive to enrollment changes. When the school 
choice program targets a subpopulation of students (e.g., students eligible for free lunch), 
the combination of a large percentage of students belonging to the subpopulation at a 
school and low CU increases faculty/enrollment sensitivity. Neither of these 
characteristics by themselves strongly influence faculty/enrollment sensitivity, though.
The size of the “small” enrollment decline matters.
For well-coordinated districts, very small enrollment declines (near 1% of total 
enrollment) can lead to near zero, or extremely large, faculty/enrollment sensitivities, and 
anything in between. Much of the variation can be attributed to differences in CU in the 
district. For districts better modeled by the school ceiling rule, very small enrollment 
declines almost universally leads to faculty enrollment sensitivities equal to zero.
Allocation costs often exist even when faculty size responds sensitively to enrollment.
The presence of fixed costs in school districts makes school choice programs lead 
to an allocation cost even when the faculty/enrollment sensitivity is greater than one. This 
outcome damages arguments by school choice proponents that districts can respond to 
small enrollment changes with balanced budgets in a way that does not harm students 
who remain in the district. Non-district school choice programs almost always lead to a 
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decrease in resources available for those students who do not participate.
Larger fixed costs in a district increase the allocation cost of school choice programs.
When the slice of a district’s budget available to provide non-instructional 
services to students is smaller, a decrease in available funding (that is not offset by a 
decrease in faculty spending) disproportionately shrinks that slice. Districts with a greater 
portion of their total budget dedicated to fixed costs will see a larger allocation cost to the 
students who remain during a non-district school choice program.
The percentage of students removed slightly influences ACP.
The simulation shows that removing more students creates a very small impact on 
the ACP of the school choice program. Removing more students, however, substantially 
decreases the likelihood that a district will experience an allocation benefit. Trials that led 
to an allocation benefit were never commonly observed: in no trial was the percentage of 
observations resulting in an allocation benefit above 10%. These two findings together 
suggest that a smaller percentage of students removed for participation in a non-district 
school choice program leads to more erratic ACP values.
How teachers are removed during faculty reduction matters a great deal.
If we assume that new, low-earning teachers leave when the faculty size shrinks, 
the calculated ACP will be much larger than if we assume that experienced, high-earning 
teachers retire and their vacancies remain unfilled. This difference increases as the 
faculty/enrollment sensitivity increases, because the number of teachers acts as a 
multiplier for the difference in salaries. After the rule used to determine the faculty size 
(i.e., the school ceiling rule or the district ceiling rule), the rule used to determine which 
teachers leave has the greatest impact on ACP.
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CHAPTER 5: Discussion
Introduction and Structure
This final chapter will discuss the results of this study. I will begin by using the 
results to answer the research questions posed in chapter one. I will then place the 
findings in a greater context of the current state of research and evaluation in the 
economics of education. A section describing the limitations of this study and a section 
discussing the generalizability of this study will follow. I will then suggest 
improvements and directions for future research. Finally, I will offer some concluding 
thoughts.
Summary and Interpretation of Results
This study primarily intends to further introduce the use of a technical method–
using a computer simulation to explore an economic system—to the economics of 
education; describing the behavior of a district during a school choice program is a 
secondary goal of this study. In this section I will present answers to the research 
questions proposed in chapter one. A summary of the findings pertaining to the 
economics of school choice can be found at the end of chapter four, and will not be 
repeated here.
Research Question 1: Can the resources (computing power, level of detail of data 
and information, etc.) available to practicing evaluators generate useful predictions 
of the cost of school choice programs?
Like so many questions, the best answer to this question is “it depends.” But the 
short answer to this question, if we must decide one way or the other, is “yes.” When 
Hertz (1957) proposed this kind of simulation for financial risk analysis, one of his 
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positions was that numerical predictions should assist human judgment, not replace it. 
The probability distributions he created showing the frequency of different outcomes of 
a financial investment were never meant to directly produce a decision; they were meant 
to help a human being make a decision about a course of action by providing a more 
thorough understanding of the likelihood of various outcomes. Like Hertz’s simulations, 
the simulation created here produces a distribution of outcome frequencies that policy 
makers can consider when faced with decisions about implementing a school choice 
program. We do not expect that policy makers will coldy apply the rules of cost-
effectiveness analysis and do whatever the numbers tell them. Rather they will weigh 
costs and effectivenesses along with harder-to-measure aspects of policies before 
deciding on a plan. The outcome of simulations like this can provide them with rich 
information not previously available.
On the other hand, if we require that a useful prediction is one that offers a 
number representing the ACP to within some small percentage—say 10%—then this 
method cannot likely provide a useful prediction. This simulation can generate a 
description of a range of ACP values, but the range produced is not particularly narrow, 
so a district should not use this simulation to determine, say, how much funding to raise 
with a bonding bill in advance of enacting a school choice program; the output is not 
sufficiently specific. 
The barrier to generating a specific prediction is not computing power, though; 
the barrier is our ability to define the rules that govern how the components interact. 
One common theme in the findings presented here is that the degree of coordination 
among schools in a district with respect to school wide class sizes versus district wide 
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class sizes matters a great deal in determining faculty/enrollment sensitivity. The two 
rules used in the simulation, the school ceiling rule and the district ceiling rule, aim to 
bookend the spectrum of intradistrict coordination. The spectrum of intradistrict 
coordination does not contain a linear range of numeric locations, however: stating that 
a district falls 65% of the way from the school ceiling rule to the district ceiling rule 
makes little sense on its own, and would be essentially impossible to write in computer 
code. Even if describing a district’s level of coordination were possible in the code, 
ascertaining the degree of coordination would pose a remarkable evaluation challenge. 
Although references to coordination problems within a school district exist in the 
literature (for example, Driscoll, Halcoussis, & Svorny, 2003; Borland, Howsen, & 
Trawick, 2003), I could not find an assessment battery that quantitatively measures the 
degree of intradistrict coordination. So until school districts begin hiring and firing 
based on the real-time application of an imutable algorithm, which is not a policy that I 
espouse in any way, this simulation will not provide decision makers with specific 
numerical results. In short, a range of outcomes described by the school ceiling rule and 
the district ceiling rule may bound the precision of the output of this simulation. 
Research Question 2: How sensitive are faculty costs to enrollment changes caused 
by school choice programs?
This number does not exist. Districts and school choice programs vary too much 
for a single number to capture reality. When a small percentage of students are drawn 
from well-utilized schools in a poorly-coordinated district, we can safely expect that the 
faculty/enrollment sensitivity will be near zero and the cost arising per participant due to 
value lost by the students who remain will be near the per pupil expenditure. If the 
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school choice program targets a subpopulation of students that are concentrated in 
poorly utilized schools in a well-coordinated district, on the other hand, we would 
expect a faculty/enrollment sensitivity above one and perhaps even a benefit to the 
students who remain in the public schools in the district. 
The absence of an answer to this question is among the most valuable potential 
contributions of this research. This finding shows that the cost of a school choice 
program will vary widely by district. And if the cost of a school choice program changes 
from district to district, then so will the attractiveness of school choice programs as a 
policy for addressing low student achievement. Thus school choice is too blunt an 
instrument to warrant serious consideration as an element of state- or nationwide 
education policy.
Some aggregate behavior observed in this simulation can contribute to our 
understanding of how allocation costs arise due to school choice programs. We can 
conclude that the presence of fixed costs makes the ACP vary within a smaller range 
than the faculty/enrollment sensitivity. Even when the faculty/enrollment sensitivity is 
near one—meaning that the percentage of students leaving the district and the 
percentage of teachers leaving the district are approximately equal—the ACP can still be 
between 35% and 65% of the per pupil expenditure in the district. In order for a school 
choice program to result in a benefit to students who remain in the district, the 
faculty/enrollment sensitivity needs to fall substantially above one, which is not 
common in any but the most favorable circumstances. We can also conclude that better 
utilized districts tend to have lower faculty/enrollment sensitivities, and that leads to 
higher ACP values.
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Research Question 3: How much will a proposed school choice program cost due to 
inefficiencies created by allocation effects?
The answer to this question will sound very similar to the previous one: it 
depends too much on the particular district and school choice program to come up with 
a single number. The range of reasonable ACP values is even quite large—somewhere 
between 0.3 and 0.85—but this still offers two insights.
First, we cannot reasonably expect ACP values of zero, and values near the 
higher end of the ACP range appear to be more common. The school choice proponents 
who claim that policies where money follows students result in cost neutrality are wrong 
about that point. Allocation effects caused by school choice programs will lead to a 
reduction in resources available to students who remain in the district schools, even 
though the magnitude of this reduction depends heavily on the district and the school 
choice program.
Second, this points to an interesting paradox for school choice proponents. 
Purely theoretical discussions of fixed costs in schools have lead to the creation of 
school choice policies that let an amount of money smaller than the per pupil 
expenditure follow students (Gotlob, 2004). Suppose that based on a simulation in a 
school district, we suspect that the ACP for a school choice program will be 0.4; we 
could reduce the cost to the students not participating by only letting 60% of the per 
pupil expenditure go to the school of the participant’s choice. The other 40% would 
remain with the district school to keep the level of resources available per student equal 
to the level present before the school choice program. Thus neither the students nor the 
schools feel a cost due to the school choice program. One goal of school choice 
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programs, however, is to incent schools to perform better as a way of retaining students 
and the dollars that follow them. If the amount of money that follows students is chosen 
such that no one feels any pain because of the school choice program, then this pressure 
will not exist: schools will have no financial incentive to try to retain students. We can 
reason that an ACP greater than zero is a necessary theoretical component of school 
choice programs, but the distasteful position of taking resources away from students 
leads some school choice advocates to search for a pain-free policy. The courses of 
action suggested by these two perspectives mutually exclude each other.
Sending a student to a school with some fraction of the per pupil expenditure 
leads us to wonder what the school receiving that student can do with it, especially in 
the case of private school vouchers. If the per pupil expenditure approximates the 
amount of money necessary to educate a student, and students using vouchers only bring 
part of that amount of money with them, then we must assume that the rest of the 
resources required for that student’s education must come from somewhere else. This 
injection of resources would count as a further cost of the voucher program, in addition 
to the benefit lost by students who do not participate. Furthermore, we expect that as the 
monetary value of an education voucher decreases, so do the number of families for 
whom the voucher will tip the scale toward attending a private school. The rest of the 
voucher program participants would have attended a private school in any event, and the 
voucher accomplishes little more than putting money back their pockets; Gotlob (2004) 
refers to the resources received by families planning to attend a private school with or 
without the voucher as the “deadweight” (p. 1) cost of the voucher program. These three 
factors—the lack of an incentive for public schools to perform better in school choice 
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programs, the need for further resources at the schools that receive school choice 
participants, and deadweight costs—suggest that offering vouchers worth part of the per 
pupil expenditure will not have either the positive effects or lack the negative 
consequences that school choice proponents suppose.
Significance and Context of Findings
Our society has recently entered the age of Big Data. The combination of 
electronic data gathering and low data storage costs mean that education systems will 
store a large and increasing amount of data about their operation. This study has offered 
further proof of concept that economic tools for other fields (in this case, finance) can be 
used on the data that education systems now possess to elevate our understanding of 
schools and districts as complex systems.
The specific results of this study—that we can expect an ACP between 0.3 and 
0.85—are of little help beyond piling evidence against the claim that school choice 
programs are cost neutral. The contribution to our understanding of school district 
finances in the context of school choice programs—that intradistrict coordination and 
capacity utilization greatly affect the cost of faculty/enrollment sensitivity—will 
hopefully elevate policy discussions and make our speculation about school choice 
programs more accurate. The great lesson pertains to using computer simulation to learn 
about the education system. Few researchers have adopted this approach. I hope that my 
contribution, when standing with the work of Nechyba, Romano, and others, will help 
push the popularity of computer simulation in the field of the economics of education 
into common use for both research and applied purposes.
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Specific implications for policy makers
Education policy makers, while not generally likely to write their own 
simulations, will encounter them with increasing frequency. This means that policy 
makers will have to develop skills to understand simulations and their output. I have a 
few pieces of advice for policy makers as they begin to encounter simulations.
Carefully distinguish specific findings from descriptions of behavior. Suppose we 
wish to conduct a literature review to help develop some new policy. The aggregate 
behavior described by a simulation in the literature can inform our discussions about this 
new policy even if the data used in that simulation do not look much like the data in the 
policy we are considering. Just because a simulation was created to model a school 
district in a different location and time does not mean that we should disregard all of the 
results from the simulation; we should only disregard the specific predictions, or at least 
carefully evaluate how relevant they are. 
My conversations with simulation skeptics lead me to believe that some people 
inappropriately question the veracity of simulation because they fall back on habits of 
doubt developed when examining regression. When determining the applicability of 
findings from a study that attempts to uncover underlying relationships by controlling 
for a large number of variables, like regression, we need to carefully consider if the 
population examined in the regression study closely matches the population affected by 
the policy in question. We should not apply the findings from a regression study to our 
new policy discussion if information about our policy setting differs substantially from 
the data used in that study; but this is not true for simulation. The randomization in 
RCTs effectively ensures that uncontrolled variables will occur evenly in the treatment 
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and control groups, and so can be omitted from the regression model. If our population 
differs from the one in the RCT, though, we have no way of knowing if the prevalence 
or absence of uncontrolled variables in the studied population would change the 
relationship in our population. Simulation does not attempt to control for variables in an 
attempt to uncover an underlying relationship between variables of interest. Rather 
simulation helps us understand the aggregate behavior of componential rules. We need 
to worry more about the assumed componential rules in a simulation than about the data 
that create its initial state, which leads to my next recommendation.
Notice what is included in the model, and what is lacking. This simulation should 
be viewed as the first step in an iterative process, not as a final product. Future 
improvements on this simulation will refine assumptions and mechanisms that I have 
included, and include components that I have ignored or overlooked. One can safely 
conclude that no simulation will perfectly represent the system it intends to model, so 
every simulation lacks something. This simulation, for example, lacks a thorough 
treatment of special education, which is a very important component of a school’s 
spending. Whoever writes the next simulation can improve upon what I have done by 
including a rich description of special education.
Creating a simulation that includes special education would be ideal, but 
acknowledging that the simulation does not include special education still aids our 
understanding of the behavior of districts during school choice programs. If we believe 
Biglaiser and Ma (2003) that schools try to attract students that cost less to educate, then 
we can assume that private and charter schools would attract few students requiring 
special education services. As students not requiring special education services leave a 
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school, the mean cost of educating the students that remain in the school will increase, 
and this will increase ACP. Although we do not know the amount that the ACP would 
increase if we model special education in this way, we would assume that the current 
numeric range of ACP values underestimates the actual ACP values we would expect for 
a school choice program.
Pay attention to the definition of “conservative.” Consider two individuals who 
might make a prediction about snowfall amounts: a ski resort owner and the head of 
snow plow contracting for an apartment complex. These individuals have an opposing 
financial stake in the amount of snow that the area receives, and thus will define 
conservative estimates differently. The ski resort owner can expect more customers, and 
thus more revenue, if more snow falls. If too little snow falls, the ski resort will have a 
short season and will have to run snow machines at great expense. When making a 
financial plan for the year, the ski resort owner will likely make a conservative estimate 
of snowfall near the low end of expected snowfall range. The head of snow plow 
contracting, on the other hand, will have to pay more for snow plowing if more snow 
falls. A conservative estimate for the snow plow contractor will lie near the high end of 
the expected snowfall range. Each individual places a conservative estimate far from 
their optimal circumstance.
Similarly, advocates on opposite sides of a policy like school choice programs 
would define optimal differently, and thus would make different conservative estimates. 
So understanding what ‘conservative’ means will help policy makers understand 
whether conservative estimates over- or underestimate important numerical metrics. In 
this analysis I attempted to include both ends of conservative (e.g., the district and the 
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school ceiling rules, faculty reduction by seniority and by retirement, etc.) so that the 
range bounded by my estimates would describe the set of reasonably likely outcomes.
Specific implications for evaluators
Simulation of economic systems offers evaluators a powerful tool in cost-
effectiveness analysis and feasibility analysis. As simulations gain popularity, I expect 
that evaluators will more often work with users who wish to incorporate simulations into 
their mix of methods. I have two specific recommendations for evaluators about using 
and working with simulations.
Develop the capacity to create simulations. Simulations like the one described 
here do not require a professional programmer; evaluators with even casual 
programming skills can learn how to write simple, but effective, simulations. Those 
evaluators without programming ability or the desire to gain it may want to make 
connections with professional programmers that they can hire if an evaluation calls for a 
simulation.
Maintain a utilization focus. Whether a simulation is written by the evaluator or 
someone outside the evaluation team, all evaluators will need to know how to interact 
with simulations. Evaluators will have to decide if simulation is an appropriate tool in a 
given context and will have to interpret the output of simulation and negotiate those 
interpretations with evaluation users. From a methodological standpoint, however, 
simulation is no different than any other technique: we need to make all decisions about 
the use of simulation from a utilization-focused perspective (Patton, 2008). We should 
avoid using simulation if the results of the simulation could not feasibly help the user 
answer evaluation questions, and we should not make the simulation any more intricate 
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than the user will find helpful. We can determine the potential utility of a simulation in 
the same way as other techniques: by mocking simulation results and asking the user to 
describe how they will react. For example, mocking up the range of outcomes generated 
by a simulation can be the beginning of an important discussion between the evaluator 
and the user. Examining mocked probability distributions of outcomes can help the user 
understand his or her appetite for risk and more easily picture best- and worst-case 
scenarios.
Limitations
This simulation operates perfectly when running on the processor in a computer. 
The limitations of this study arise from the input data that initially creates the simulated 
districts and from the assumptions that describe the rules in the simulation.
Issues with the input data
The data from the California Department of Education contain some errors. 
These errors only became noticeable when data from one source conflicted with data 
from another source; for example, when the number of students eligible for free lunch 
exceeded the total number of students enrolled. This situation indicates either an error in 
the free lunch eligibility calculation or an error in the total enrollment calculation, and 
will only be noticeable when the two numbers are similar. If the number of students 
eligible for free lunch is half of the total enrollment this discrepancy could still exist, but 
would not raise a flag in the simulation. For this reason, we have no way of assessing 
the absolute accuracy of the input data. 
The lack of a method for accurately assessing the error rate does not render the 
data from California useless. Trusting readers can assume that the California Department 
A COMPUTER SIMULATION OF SCHOOL DISTRICT ECONOMICS 136
of Education would not allow errors in their data that are both very common and very 
large. And even though these errors exist, they should not shake our confidence in the 
findings from this study. Unlike a regression analysis, this simulation does not seek to 
uncover an underlying relationship in a set of variables. Small deviations in individual 
data will thus not greatly affect the relationship. This simulation strives to examine the 
aggregate behavior that occurs due to componential rules, so unless we have some 
reason to suspect that the erroneous input data would lead to different aggregate 
behavior, we should not count small errors in the input data as threats to the validity of 
these results.
Issues with assumptions
Using class size laws to predict the cost of teachers in a school only accounts for 
approximately half of the actual cost of the teaching faculty. This suggests that the logic 
used to determine staffing at a school is more complicated than a simple formula based 
on numbers of students, and we have no reason to suspect that this logic is either 
uniform to any degree or deterministic enough to fit nicely into a function in a computer 
simulation. While the simulation used in this research does offer some insight into how 
the predictable faculty size (the number of teachers that we can predict using class size 
rules) responds to small enrollment changes, and this insight is useful, the predictable 
faculty size seems to be only part of the story.
In particular, this study does not take some kinds of instruction into account. The 
model of the education system used in this simulation assumes that all students (1) 
attend class staffed by a single teacher, (2) receive instruction only from that teacher, 
and (3) receive an equal amount of education resources. None of these assumptions 
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match reality well. Some students attend class with a paraprofessional for some or all of 
a school day. Some teachers do not run classrooms of their own, but rather assist the 
instruction of other teachers as content specialists. Some students receive more 
educational resources than others, including but not limited to students who receive 
special education services. The absence of these intricacies of the American education 
system both help explain why the calculated salaries in the simulation equal only about 
half of the actual spending that goes toward instruction. It also highlights the limits of 
the accuracy of this simulation. I assumed that all of the instructional spending not 
calculated directly from the enrollment was independent of the number of students. This 
assumption obviously breaks down for large changes in enrollment; for example, the 
number of paraprofessionals employed by a school would likely decline if the number of 
students decreases by half. The assumption that all instructional spending not calculated 
by enrollment is fixed would functionally increase the percentage of the school’s 
spending that is fixed and overestimate the ACP.
Generalizability
One possible complaint about this study is that the input data are too specific: 
The simulation is built on three grades in one state from one academic year. This 
specificity does limit the utility of the numerical findings, but precise numerical findings 
were never a goal of this work. If instead we look at the input data as a way of starting 
with a realistic distribution of parameters—a set of numbers of schools in a district, 
numbers of students per grade, distribution of socioeconomic statuses, etc. that existed 
somewhere at some time—then these data do satisfy their role. In other years or other 
locations the mean classes might be a bit fuller, the mean schools a bit bigger, or the 
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mean districts a bit smaller. These situations merely mean that fuller classes, larger 
schools, and smaller districts are more common than in the data I used. But the data 
upon which this simulation is built contain full classes, large schools, and small districts, 
and these were compared to emptier classes, small schools, and large districts. The value 
of using such a large range of real data as inputs is that they allow for the examination of 
a correspondingly large range of simulated behavior. For example, we can explore the 
relationship between simulated faculty/enrollment sensitivity and, say, how full a class 
is (measured by the variable CU). That relationship is among the most important 
findings generated by this study, and we would not imagine that a different mix of low-
CU and high-CU schools would lead to a different relationship between CU and 
faculty/enrollment sensitivity. Because the most important response variable—the 
faculty/enrollment sensitivity—is calculated entirely within the simulation, we do not 
need to worry about exogenous variables, and thus the specificity of the input data does 
not detract from the most important findings in this study.
Improvements and Directions for Future Research
This study represents a first step into using simulation to stress-test a school 
district. The preceding discussion has outlined some of the limitations and shortcomings 
of this study, and in this section I will describe some small tweaks that could improve 
the current study and directions for future research. I will begin with modest changes 
that could improve this simulation and expand to larger research suggestions.
Using different rules to remove students
This study only examined two ways of removing students: selecting students 
with equal probability and selecting exclusively from a heterogeneously distributed 
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subpopulation. Several other options exist for selecting students that could model 
interesting real or hypothesized behavior of schools. (1) As students are pseudorandomly 
selected for participation in the counterfactual school choice program, the other students 
in that grade could have a slightly increased probability of selection. This would model 
the case where the teacher quality causes families to more strongly consider changing 
schools. (2) Biglaiser and Ma (2003) suggest that private schools and charter schools 
have an economic incentive to attract students that are inexpensive to educate. The 
simulation presented here examined the behavior of school districts when students are 
chosen exclusively from a subpopulation—as with an income threshold defined in the 
policy—but not when students are preferentially chosen from a subpopulation. This 
could be accomplished in the simulation by giving students in the subpopulation a 
weight several times greater or smaller than everyone else, but not giving any student a 
probability of being selected for participation of zero.
Including the variable cost of educating students
The incentive to attract students with low education costs suggests another small 
improvement. Instead of representing “high cost” students in the simulation merely as 
having lower probability of being selected for participation in the school choice 
program, students could be assigned an extra cost of their education. From that extra 
cost, a probability of being chosen for selection could be determined, but this extra cost 
could also be represented in the accounting aspects of the model. If the simulation 
selected a student with high extra education costs for participation—a relatively unlikely 
event—that student’s absence would free up some resources for the students who remain 
at the school. If the simulation selects only students with low extra education costs for 
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participation, the resources available after paying for fixed costs and instructional costs 
would be even lower for students who remain. 
Writing componential rules into the simulation to account for unequal costs of 
educating students would not pose a challenge, but two other aspects of including this 
feature in the model would. First, selecting numbers for “extra education costs” would 
require careful attention. Some students in special education programs receive education 
resources many times greater than the per pupil expenditure. The range of costs would 
be huge and running the simulation with an inaccurate frequency distribution could 
make the outputs erratic and meaningless. Second, describing students receiving special 
education services only as more expensive cogs in a financial system seems to run 
contrary to the spirit of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act.
Examining allocation costs over time
The simulation created for this research only examines the impact of a school 
choice program during the first year of its implementation. No regression toward an 
efficient equilibrium over the course of several academic years is considered. The basic 
structure of this simulation could be recursively applied, i.e., the output of one year’s 
simulation could be the input of the next year’s simulation. Some amount of planning on 
the part of the district could then be incorporated into the model that would change the 
school assignment of some incoming kindergarten or first grade students so that the 
schools in the district would again have efficiently utilized capital.
Calibrating the rules used to assign teachers
Perhaps the most important and least accurate aspect of this research is the level 
of intradistrict coordination bookended by the school ceiling and district ceiling rules. 
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Interviews of and interactive simulations with principals and district officials would give 
a much more complete picture of how teachers are assigned to schools based on 
enrollment and in what cases a teaching position would be eliminated. This kind of 
inquiry could also shed some light on how the half of instructional spending not 
predicted by this simulation is spent and how that might behave in response to small 
enrollment changes. Unlike this simulation, such research would be very specific and 
would not likely lead to highly generalizable findings.
Updating existing research that uses estimates of the cost of school choice programs
The initial motivation for this study came from Yeh’s (2007, 2010) work using 
cost-effectiveness analysis to compare proposed solutions to low student achievement. 
In these works Yeh supposes that the faculty size sensitivity to small enrollment changes 
will be zero and the ACP will be one. This research shows that neither of those 
suppositions are entirely reasonable. But they are likely closer to accurate than not. The 
range of ACP values suggested here could be used to update Yeh’s reasoning, which 
would have two impacts. First, the overall cost of school vouchers in his analysis would 
decrease, but not by much. Second, our confidence in these estimates would increase 
and school choice advocates would have less opportunity to attack his assumptions.
The improvements to our understanding of allocation costs could raise the level 
of detail in large cost analyses of school choice programs conducted by Levin (1997). 
Levin’s work examines many sources of cost and lost value associated with 
implementing a voucher program (e.g., the cost of informing the community, the cost of 
adjudicating disputes, etc.), and the results of this simulation could refine the section 
concerning allocation costs.
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Including other step costs
I will propose another category of allocation cost that could be included in a 
simulation like this. This other cost can reasonably be included because it behaves as a 
step cost to some degree in that it will remain fixed for a range of enrollments, and 
change relatively dramatically as enrollment crosses a threshold: busing. Adding busing 
to the simulation would present its own set of challenges. Deciding how many buses a 
district requires depends on more than just the number of students in the district, it also 
depends on where those students live. For example, targeting certain income groups for 
participation in a voucher program may inadvertently target students from certain 
neighborhoods, which could make the relationship between the number of students in 
the district and the number of buses required much more complicated. In this simulation 
busing was included as a fixed cost, so including busing as a step cost could only 
decrease the projected ACP of a voucher program.
Conclusion
I began this work by describing how an improved estimate of the cost of school 
choice programs can help ameliorate the problem of low student achievement in some 
small way. In the ensuing pages I described a technique using a stress-testing model 
developed in the world of finance to examine allocation costs in a district caused by a 
school choice program. After executing this simulation, I presented both numeric results 
about what we can expect in terms of allocation costs, and a qualitative description of 
how the components of a district interact to create those allocation costs.
We should not lose sight of the fact that this dissertation ultimately aims to help the 
economics of education keep up with economic methods in other fields. Areas like 
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meteorology, epidemiology, finance, and marketing have realized the benefits of using 
computer simulation to help understand and master complex systems. I will conjecture 
that these areas have adopted modern analytical technology like computer simulation 
because these fields have strong incentives for accurate prediction. Although accurate 
predictions in education are valuable, the education system does not offer the same kind 
of incentives for accuracy—no one is directly going to get rich by predicting the cost of 
an educational policy more accurately than their competitors. I hope that this work will 
help move computer simulation from the realm of science fiction and into the toolbox 
for practicing evaluators and education policy makers.
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